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INTRODUCTION
Purchasing fine art may in itself be an artistic endeavor
full of risks and rewards.
Auction houses present an
opportunity to acquire artwork for lower rates as a
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consequence of the risk associated with consignment
transactions.1 Purchases from dealers, on the other hand,
often involve a premium that corresponds to the lower risk of
a direct transaction.2
Additionally, works with greater
assurances of authenticity sell at higher prices. 3 Legal
analysis of transactions in fine art often centers on how best
to appropriate this risk, particularly with respect to the

1. See Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. Ch. 2006); Patty
Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 501, 555 (1988); Kai B. Singer, “Sotheby’s Sold Me A Fake!”—Holding
Auction Houses Accountable for Authenticating and Attributing Works of Fine Art, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 439, 452 (2000). Historically, an auction house would enter
into a consignment relationship with a seller whereby its financial interest in the
artwork would be limited to the commission earned on the sale and the purchaser
would assume a greater risk regarding its authenticity. Gerstenblith supra, at 555;
LEONARD D. DUBOFF & SALLY HOLT CAPLAN, 1 THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW M-11 to -15
(2d ed. 2010); J. ALEXANDRA DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITECTURE & MUSEUM LAW
§ 5:4, at 291 (2010). Since the 1980‘s, however, auction houses have increasingly
expanded the types of their transactions, services, and clientele. Id.; Gerstenblith
supra, at 555; DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra, at M-10 to -11. For the purposes of this
Article the term ―auction house‖ generally connotes a transaction involving a
consignment relationship between a seller and an auction house via a bidding process
through which a purchaser is bound according to the Conditions of Sale. See DUBOFF &
HOLT CAPLAN, supra, at M-11, M-15; Jonathon A. Olsoff, Auction Law, in ART LAW
HANDBOOK § 11.03[A], at 920 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 28(2) (1981). Auction houses comprise the largest secondary
art market. DARRABY, supra, § 5:4, at 284. Two auction houses, Christie‘s and
Sotheby‘s, control ninety percent of the worldwide market. Id.
2. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 554–55. Dealers often purchase the artwork
themselves prior to resale thereby becoming the seller with a comprehensive financial
stake in the piece. Id. at 554. As such, they assume more financial risk in warranting
the authenticity of a work. See id. at 555. Dealers do presently engage in a variety of
different types of transactions, which may include consignment arrangements.
DARRABY, supra note 1, § 2:12, at 46. For the purposes of this Article, the term ―dealer‖
will connote transactions whereby a purchaser acquires a piece directly from an art
merchant owner. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 554–55.
3. See Steven Mark Levy, Authentication and Appraisal of Artwork, in ART LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 10.02[A], at 834 (authenticity and provenance are
important factors in appraising the value of artwork); see also DARRABY, supra note 1, §
4:19, at 239 (―If on occasion authorship drops out of the bargain, a huge and palpable
price differential would be apparent.‖); id. § 2:58, at 88 (―Certain prior owners or events
may effectively enhance value by providing the artworks with a cachet.‖). This Article
discusses misattribution and mistaken provenance as they relate to market valuation
since other articles discuss similar issues relative to good title. E.g., Bruce W. Burton,
In Search of John Constable’s The White Horse: A Case Study in Tortured Provenance
and Proposal for a Torrens-Like System of Title Registration for Artwork, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 531 (2007). Due to its focus on valuation, this Article also uses the term
―authentication‖ to refer to both attribution and provenance. But see Levy, supra, §
10.02[A], at 834 (defining authentication to include attribution not provenance).
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customer who has yet to sharpen his ―artistic‖ eye.4
Early English case law historically provided protection for
purchasers of art through either breach of an express
warranty of authenticity or common law fraud.5
Contemporary American law broadens protection to include
the potential for indefinite merchant liability, which raises
questions regarding the best way to govern authentication
given the unique nature of artwork.6 Scholars typically
propose one of three theories of liability to adjust buyer
protection.7 The application of securities laws to the art
market is another potential solution.8
Yet the scholarly proposals will provide limited benefit and
will disproportionately upset the art market.9 To the extent
securities laws are even applicable to art transactions, they
too will marginally supplement protection and unduly
interfere with market principles.10 The better approach is to
implement flexible disclosure requirements uniquely tailored
to the authentication of artwork in order to promote more
efficient pricing.11
I. EARLY ENGLISH COMMON LAW PROTECTED BUYERS FROM
MISTAKEN AUTHENTICITY
Early English case law provides a benchmark for handling
mistaken authentication. Claims for breach of warranty were
available at common law and did not have an intent
requirement, but were subject to a limited filing period. 12
Alternatively, the buyer could file a common law fraud action
that included the ―discovery rule,‖ but required proof of
4. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 519; Singer, supra note 1, at 440; Raul
Jauregui, Rembrandt Portraits: Economic Negligence in Art Attribution, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1947, 2023–28 (1997). Indeed, art can be an analogy for much of anything done in
life, including the theoretical analysis of pricing legal claims. See Robert J. Rhee, A
Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and
Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 625 (2006) (―[L]ike a brushstroke of
an impressionistic painting, each theory adds to the mosaic.‖).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part VII.
12. See infra Part I.A.
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specific intent.13 While both actions had their strengths and
weaknesses, the dispositive issue in the case law was whether
or not there was in fact a mistake in authentication.14
A. Breach of Express Warranty at Common Law
At early English common law, a purchaser could hold a
seller liable pursuant to a breach of an express warranty of
authenticity.15 A seller could create a warranty by using the
word ―warrant‖16 and by making a representation of
authenticity that was an affirmation of fact, not an opinion.17
The case of Jendwine v. Slade suggested that antiquities did
not meet this requirement because seller representations of
authenticity for very old works could only constitute
opinions.18 The buyer must also have relied on the seller‘s
representation, which could be apparent as a consequence of
the price of the piece19 or the relative knowledge of the
parties.20 While a buyer that incurred damages for a breach
on resale had an action against the original seller,21 filing
periods limited claims for breach of warranty generally.22
B. Action for Fraud at Common Law
Common law fraud provided an alternative pleading to a
claim for a breach of warranty in matters dealing with

13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See generally Power v. Barham, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 865; Pennell v.
Woodburn, (1835) 173 Eng. Rep. 52; De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan, (1832) 172 Eng. Rep.
1004; Lomi v. Tucker, (1829) 172 Eng. Rep. 586; Jendwine v. Slade, (1797) 170 Eng.
Rep. 459.
16. See De Sewhanberg, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1004 (trial testimony that seller expressly
used the word ―warrant‖ in stating that the painting was an authentic Rembrandt).
17. See, e.g., Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 460.
18. See id. The rationale in Jendwine was that a representation regarding the
authenticity of an antiquity was inherently speculative on account of the age of the
work and therefore could not constitute an affirmation of fact. Id. But see case analysis
in Part I.C., infra.
19. Lomi, 172 Eng. Rep. at 587.
20. De Sewhanberg, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1005.
21. See Pennell v. Woodburn, (1835) 173 Eng. Rep. 52, 52 (jury instructions
indicating plaintiff buyer entitled to recover for damages from warranty breach on
resale if initial transaction was in fact a bona fide sale).
22. See Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 459–60 (defense of breach of warranty to seller
suit for non-payment could be time-barred absent the ―discovery rule‖ in fraud claim).
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mistaken authentication of artwork.23 An action for fraud at
common law required a showing of specific intent to deceive
and not merely the creation and breach of a warranty.24
Fraud claims also benefitted from an extended filing period
based on the ―discovery rule,‖ which tolled the accrual of the
statute of limitations.25 Early English fraud claims balanced
the heightened requirement of specific intent with the lenient
filing period of the ―discovery rule.‖26
C. The Dispositive Issue of Mistaken Authenticity
While Jendwine v. Slade suggested that a seller could not
warrant authenticity for antiquities, a careful reading of early
English case law reveals that the dispositive issue was
whether there was a mistake in the authentication.27 The
Jendwine court pointed to the ages of the works to assert that
the affirmations were opinions, but the artists in question
each died a little over 100 years before the case and the trial
involved conflicting testimony from ―several of the most
eminent art experts.‖28 Yet in De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan
the court submitted the question of warranty to the jury,
notwithstanding the seller‘s reliance on the Jendwine
decision, when expert testimony unequivocally stated that the
painting was not a Rembrandt and Rembrandt died 163 years
before the trial.29 Therefore, the dispositive issue in breach of
23. See id.; see also Power v. Barham, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 865; Lomi, 172 Eng.
Rep. at 587.
24. See Power, 111 Eng. Rep. at 866 (arguing pre-sale catalogue attributing
paintings in Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 459, constituted stronger evidence of a
―positive undertaking‖ of fraud then the bills of parcels in the case at bar).
25. Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 460 (no time bar when party ―comes recently after
the discovery of the deception‖).
26. See Power, 111 Eng. Rep. at 866; Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 460.
27. See De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan, (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1004–05;
Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 460; see also Lomi, 172 Eng. Rep. at 587.
28. See Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 459. Lorraine died in 1682, which translates to
115 years before the case. See Art Biography of Claude Lorraine (French, 1604–1682),
Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, http://
www.metmuseum.org/toah/hi/hi_locl.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). Teniers died in
1690 or 107 years before the case. See Art Biography of David Teniers the Younger
(Flemish, 1610–1690), Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hi/hi_tenyoungdav.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
29. See 172 Eng. Rep. at 1004–05; Biography of Rembrandt van Rijn (Dutch, 1606–
1669), Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, http://
www.metmuseum.org/toah/hi/hi_remb.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). See also Lomi,
172 Eng. Rep. at 587 (warranty of Poussin authenticity submitted to jury when artist
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warranty cases was likely expert testimony speaking to the
issue of a mistake in the authentication.30
II. EXPANSION OF PROTECTION AT CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN LAW DEVELOPS POLICY CONCERNS
Contemporary American law has expanded protection for
purchasers of artwork with a mistake in authentication.31
The codification of warranty claims pursuant to the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) has expanded buyer protection and
common law fraud claims remain available as an additional
remedy.32 The two theories enjoy a symbiotic relationship
such that evidence of fraudulent concealment can toll the
UCC statute of limitations and at least one jurisdiction has
held that this tolling may occur even in the absence of fraud. 33
Given its potential for indefinite liability in the absence of
fraud, this holding raises serious policy questions regarding
the most appropriate way to protect purchasers in light of the
unique nature of artwork.34

died 170 years before the case and opinion defense not raised); Art Biography of Nicolas
Poussin (French, 1594–1665), Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, METRO. MUSEUM OF
ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hi/hi_pous.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011);
Power, 111 Eng. Rep. at 866 (no opinion defense for authentication of Canaletto who
died seventy years before the case); Art Biography of Canaletto (Canal, Giovanni
Antonio) (Italian, 1697–1798), Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, METRO. MUSEUM OF
ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hi/hi_canal.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
30. See De Sewhanberg, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1004–05; Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 459;
Lomi, 172 Eng. Rep. at 587.
31. For a discussion of buyer remedies presently available in addition to breach of
warranty and common law fraud see Levy supra note 3, §§ 10.02[B][2], [4], 10.04[B][6],
[7] (state consumer statutes and statutes governing dealer representations, as well as
claims for negligent misrepresentation in appropriate circumstances); DARRABY, supra
note 1, § 5:67–70 (discussing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) claims in art transactions); see also Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1556, 1567–68 (D. Haw. 1990) (art fraud action brought under RICO).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See infra Part II.C.
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A. UCC Warranty and Common Law Fraud
Breach of warranty and fraud claims remain35 and have
strengthened or broadened in many instances.36 The UCC
broadens buyer protection by eliminating any requirement
that the seller expressly use the word ―warrant‖37 and by
allowing an opinion to constitute a ―fact‖ if it forms the ―basis
of the bargain.‖38 The UCC also now expressly presumes
35. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-85 to -92 (discussing breach of
warranty claims in art transactions); Levy, supra note 3, §§ 10.02[B][1], [3], 10.04[B][5]
(discussing claims for breach of warranty and fraud governing art sales). At times, this
Article refers to both the UCC and the case law as the ―common law‖ because the UCC
often incorporates pre-code common law. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON
LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 1.03, at 1–4 (1985) (UCC
often restates common law rules, employs common law terms, and selects the best rule
from conflicting common law opinions).
36. Legal recourse for buyers in contract or in tort based on allegations of auction
house misrepresentations requires the additional step of establishing that the auction
house as consignee constitutes an agent for the seller. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 6.11(2)–(3) (statements of agent incident to a contract are attributable to
principal); id. § 6.11 cmt. e (statements incidental to contract include warranties); id. §§
7.01, 7.04, 7.08 (agent liable for own tortious conduct and principal liable for tortious
conduct of agent). While the case law is sparing, establishing an agency relationship
between an auction house and a consignor should not be too difficult since key
jurisdictions have unequivocally found such a relationship in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Int‘l, Inc., 117 A.D. 284, 292 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (―The Auctioneer is the agent of the consignor.‖). It is also commonly
understood that the auction house is an agent of the consignor. Olsoff, supra note 1, §
11.02[A], at 904 (―[T]he relationship between an auction house and a consignor is
governed by basic principles of agency law.‖). Moreover, the auction house has actual
authority with respect to appraisal services in most cases. See Olsoff, supra note 1, §
11.02[B], at 913–14 (typical consignment agreement leaves consultation of experts and
research to the ―sole discretion‖ of the auction house).
37. U.C.C. § 2-313(3) (2004) (―It is not necessary to the creation of an express
warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‗warrant‘ or ‗guarantee‘ or that he
have a specific intention to make a warranty . . . .‖).
38. § 2-313(2)(a) (2004); see also § 2-313 cmt. 10 (an opinion is something that
cannot be fairly viewed as entering into the bargain). When dealing with attribution of
artwork, the distinction between fact and opinion often becomes plainly apparent based
on the price of the piece. See Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at 834 (authenticity and
provenance affect appraisal); DARRABY, supra note 1, § 4:19, at 239 (―If on occasion
authorship drops out of the bargain, a huge and palpable price differential would be
apparent.‖); id. § 2:58, at 88 (―Certain prior owners or events may effectively enhance
value by providing the artworks with a cachet.‖). This distinction was also plainly
apparent centuries ago at early English common law where it reflected the creation of a
warranty and buyer reliance. See Lomi v. Tucker, (1829) 172 Eng. Rep. 586, 587 (jury
rejects argument that price reflects sale of copies). The benefit of the codification of this
principle through state adoption of the UCC becomes particularly apparent in states
that would otherwise statutorily mandate caveat emptor. See Weisz v. Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc., 325 N.Y.S.2d 576, 583 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev’d 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y.
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buyer reliance on the statements of the seller if such
statements were made ―during the bargain.‖39
While
disclaimers exist to protect sellers from unlimited liability,
they must be construed reasonably in light of any
warranties.40 Fraud theories remain intact and continue to
extend the limitations period pursuant to the ―discovery
rule.‖41
Misattribution determined by expert testimony,
however, remains the dispositive factor in the case.42
App. Term 1974) (per curiam); infra note 145.
39. § 2-313 cmts. 5 & 8 (2004). This presumption of reliance was also available
prior to the 2003 amendments. U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 3 (1995). The presumption of
reliance is embedded in the concept of the opinion-fact distinction because if a seller‘s
opinion ―forms the basis of the bargain‖ thereby becoming a ―fact,‖ then the buyer relied
on it. § 2-313(2)–(3) (2004). For this reason any knowledge asymmetry of the parties
may be a factor in the analysis as it was at early English common law. See Balog v.
Ctr. Art Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (D. Haw. 1990) (court points to
superior expertise of art seller in determining buyer reliance); De Sewhanberg v.
Buchanan, (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1005 (court considers relative knowledge of
parties); see also Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819,
821 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting plaintiffs were art dealers before barring claim via UCC
statute of limitations).
40. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004). The two major U.S. auction houses typically
warrant authenticity for five years with Sotheby‘s excluding only authorship for pre1870 works unless they are found to be counterfeit. See FORM 11-1, Conditions of Sale
and Limited Warranty—Christie’s, reprinted in Olsoff, supra note 1, at 935–37
[hereinafter Christie’s Conditions of Sale]; FORM 11-2, Conditions of Sale and Terms of
Guarantee—Sotheby’s, reprinted in Olsoff, supra note 1, at 941–42 [hereinafter
Sotheby’s Conditions of Sale]. But see Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 783
(Del. Ch. 2006) (involving a six-year warranty in Christie‘s auction sale). As at early
English common law, see supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text, an intermediary
can sue the original seller when necessary, see generally Mickle v. Christie‘s, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Christie‘s sues seller for damages incurred after granting
buyer rescission for mistaken authentication), and warranty actions are limited by a
filing period. E.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 2011) (four years accruing upon
tender of delivery).
41. See, e.g., Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 35 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990). The elements
of fraud are typically: 1) a false representation of 2) a material 3) fact 4) where the
defendant knew of the falsity and 5) made the statement for the purpose of inducing the
plaintiff to rely on it and 6) the plaintiff did in fact justifiably rely on the statement 7)
causing damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–526, 531, 537–538, and
546 (1977). Fraud theories have also arguably broadened in some jurisdictions. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 740 (5th ed. 1984) (noting some
courts ―allow recovery in deceit for misrepresentation which falls short of actual intent
to deceive‖).
42. See Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 467–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(liability for a piece when opposing expert conceded it may have been misattributed and
no liability for another piece when all experts agreed upon authenticity); Greenberg
Gallery, Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 169–71 (D.D.C. 1993) (no liability when
piece‘s distinguishing characteristics were a result of damage done in transit by
purchaser and therefore not indicative of mistaken authenticity); see also Pritzker v.
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B. The Symbiosis of Warranty and Fraud Claims
Contemporary American law provides additional
protection to art purchasers by creating a symbiotic
relationship between these two theories.43 A breach of
warranty claim is easier to prove since a fraud claim requires
a showing of specific intent.44 On account of the ―discovery
rule,‖ a fraud claim provides buyers with more protection
since it is not subject to the UCC statute of limitations.45
Courts combine these theories by allowing the ―discovery rule‖
to toll the UCC statute of limitations when there is evidence
of fraudulent concealment.46
Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts Inc., No. 93 C 4147, 1996 WL 563442, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 1996) (authenticity is the least appropriate issue for summary judgment when
both sides present experts with opposite views). Some jurisdictions subject authenticity
to a standard of proof by inquiring whether the seller had ―a reasonable basis in fact.‖
See Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 467; Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1566.
43. Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73; Rosen, 894 F.2d at 35.
44. Compare U.C.C. § 2-313(3) (2004) (―It is not necessary to the creation of an
express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‗warrant‘ or ‗guarantee‘ or
that he have a specific intention to make a warranty . . . .‖), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977) (scienter requirement for fraud). This distinction
permeates the difference between contract and tort law and is apparent in the concept
of efficient breach of contract. While discussing efficient breaches, contract professors
note that ―students are sometimes troubled by the rather stark fact that the law does
not actually require a promisor to keep his promise, but instead treats the payment of
money damages as a wholly adequate remedy for breach.‖ MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 176 (5th ed. 2006).
45. See e.g., Rosen, 894 F.2d at 35. The UCC statute of limitations varies by state.
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-2-725(1), 13-80-101(1) (West 2010) (three years),
with S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(1) (2010) (six years). The 2003 amendments to the
UCC expanded temporal protection for warranties. Compare U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2004)
(suit for breach must be brought within the later of four years of the accrual of the
cause of action or one year after the breach was or should have been discovered subject
to a five-year statute of repose), with U.C.C. § 2-725(1)–(2) (1995) (suit for breach must
be brought within four years and action accrues upon tender of delivery). The benefit of
this change to the UCC is limited in the auction house context since many auction
houses warrant authentication for five years or more. See supra note 40.
46. Compare Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73 (allowing evidence of fraudulent
concealment to toll the statute of limitations under Hawaii‘s adoption of UCC § 2725(1)), with Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 821
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (refusing to toll the statute of limitations under Pennsylvania‘s
adoption of UCC § 2-725(1) in the absence of fraudulent concealment). In both Balog
and Firestone, the sellers assured the buyers that the pieces were originals after the
sale. Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73; Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 820. Yet the nature of
these assurances is distinguishable as the Firestone seller gave a single oral assurance
with respect to a particular piece whereas the Balog sellers provided multiple
certificates of authenticity during continued sales to the buyers spanning several years.
Id. at 820; Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1558–59. The context of the assurances is also
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Depending on the jurisdiction, this extension may even be
applicable in the absence of fraudulent concealment.47 In
Rosen v. Spanierman, the Second Circuit rejected the view
that the authentication of artwork automatically constitutes
an explicit warranty under UCC § 2-725(2) without the seller
expressly stating that the warranty applies to future
performance.48 Instead, the court remanded the fraud claim49
and indicated that in its view of the facts it was not timebarred.50 In Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., on the
other hand, a federal district court held that artwork
automatically constitutes an explicit warranty of future
performance under UCC § 2-725(2).51 Nevertheless, this
ruling was an alternative holding in addition to the tolling
due to concealment52 when the defendants were previously

distinguishable since the Balog buyers did not have prior actual notice to suspect
misattributions, while the Firestone buyers had such notice based on the opinions of
independent art experts. Id.; Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 820. Finally, fraudulent intent
was absent in Firestone since the painting was reattributed as a consequence of a postsale article published by an art expert, a fact clearly distinguishable from Balog where
the sellers were criminally convicted for selling counterfeit works. Id. at 820–21; Balog,
745 F. Supp. at 1560. As if all of this were not enough, the Firestone buyers were art
dealers whereas the Balog buyers were a family of tourists (from the state of
Washington no less) vacationing in Hawaii (perhaps even wearing Hawaiian shirts and
flip flops during the first sale) and unknowledgeable about the art world. Id. at 1558;
Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 821.
47. Compare Balog, 745 F. Supp. 1569–72, with Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31–33.
48. 894 F.2d at 31–33; see also Wilson v. Hammer, 850 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1988)
(rejecting argument that warranty of future performance under UCC § 2-725(2) applies
in absence of explicit promise). Perhaps the Rosen court did not discuss the issue of
fraudulent concealment tolling the limitations period under UCC § 2-725(1) because it
was not raised by the plaintiffs, who instead presented the seller‘s continued appraisal
of the painting as evidence of an extended warranty. See id. at 31–33. But see Balog,
745 F. Supp. at 1568 (plaintiffs argue that all applicable statute of limitations are tolled
by fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant). Other courts have refused to
toll the limitations period for negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud
actions. See Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 777–83 (Del. Ch. 2006) (denial of
motion to amend fraud pleadings to include ―constructive fraud and/or negligent
misrepresentation‖ since actions were time-barred). This denial was likely because the
attempt to amend was a last ditch effort in a dying fraud claim. See id.
49. Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31–37.
50. Id. at 36 n.2.
51. 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72.
52. Id. at 1572–73. Therefore the wording is arguably dicta since the case involved
fraudulent concealment that tolled UCC § 2-725(1). See id. Even if the wording is not
dicta, the alternative holding is unnecessary for the same reason. See id. Moreover,
the authority of this ruling is questionable since the Federal District Court of Hawaii
was deciding issues of state law pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 1558 n.1.
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found guilty of criminal charges for selling counterfeits.53 The
courts effectively reached the same result through different
legal holdings that were appropriate based on varying
evidence of fraud.54
C. New Policy Concerns Regarding Art Merchant Liability
The outcomes of Rosen and Balog provided an appropriate
balance of several policy issues based on their relative
findings of fact.55 These cases balance the incentive to hire an
independent appraiser in light of the value of the piece since
the Rosen case involved a single work with an estimated
value that was approximately seven times that of all four
pieces in Balog.56 They also balance the equitable principles
of tolling with the relative indicia of fraud since Rosen had
less evidence of fraud than Balog where the defendants had
been criminally convicted for selling counterfeits.57 Based on
their facts, the case outcomes are reasonable.58
Yet their disparate legal holdings raise the question of how
to structure art merchant liability in the absence of fraud
given the unique nature of artwork.59 Original artwork
derives its value largely from authenticity,60 yet the
speculative nature of authentication is distinguishable from

53. See id. at 1560. Perhaps the federal judge was simply sending the message to
con artists that they will not get away with ripping off tourists in Hawaii. See id.; see
also DARRABY, supra note 1, § 4:33, at 252 (heavy-handed ruling may have been a
result of tourist-oriented economy in Hawaii).
54. Compare Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73, with Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31–37. See
also supra notes 46, 48; infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73; Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31–37.
56. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1561; Rosen, 894 F.2d at 30, 33. Unlike Balog,
which involved the purchase of four purported Dali originals worth a total of $36,000 in
the late 1970‘s to early 1980‘s, see 745 F. Supp. at 1561, the Rosen case involved a
single work purported to be a John Singer Sargent with a market value ranging from
$175,000 to $250,000 in the mid-1970‘s to mid-1980‘s. See 894 F.2d at 30, 33.
57. The seller in Rosen had not been criminally convicted of fraud and did not sell
multiple works to the plaintiffs with ―confidential certificates of authenticity,‖ contra
Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1558, 1560, but did provide multiple post-sale insurance
appraisals at the request of the buyers and the first independent appraiser immediately
suspected it was a fake. Rosen, 894 F.2d at 30.
58. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572–73; Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31–37.
59. See, e.g., DARRABY, supra note 1, § 4:36, at 254 (distinguishing artwork from
utilitarian goods).
60. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at 834 (authenticity important factor in
appraising value of artwork).
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most other warranties.61 Authentication can fail simply due
to changes in expert opinion resulting from new information.62
Additionally, transactions in artwork entail an expectation of
the potential for appreciation in value not shared with
transactions in many other goods.63 The decisions therefore
raise the question of whether the best means of addressing
the uniqueness of art is to hold merchants indefinitely liable
for authenticity.64
III. SCHOLARS PROPOSE THEORIES TO ADJUST BUYER
PROTECTION
There are three leading scholarly theories for imposing
additional regulations upon the art market in order to protect
unsophisticated purchasers.65 The first theory creates a
fiduciary duty or agency relationship between the buyer and
merchant.66 The second theory imposes strict liability upon
sellers and auction houses for issues involving mistaken
61. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-25 (noting difficulty of
establishing authenticity of aged pieces with 100% certainty); DARRABY, supra note 1, §
4:36, at 254 (discussing relative ease of evaluating warranties of goods covering
intrinsic components with utilitarian functions).
62. See, e.g., Firestone v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 820–21 (postsale reattribution via art scholar publication). For this reason, some jurisdictions
protect art merchants with ―the reasonable basis in fact‖ inquiry such that they may
only be held liable if their representations as to authenticity had no ―reasonable basis
in fact.‖ See Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also
Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1566.
63. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1 to -9 (discussing investment
value of art); DARRABY, supra note 1, § 4:36, at 254 (utilitarian goods expected to
depreciate in value and exit market). The price of artwork therefore reflects a
combination of this potential for appreciation with the risk as to authenticity in light of
warranties and disclaimers. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781
(Del. Ch. 2006) (risk as to authenticity is factored into bid price at auction); DUBOFF &
HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1 to -9 (art can appreciate in value).
64. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72 (authentication automatically constitutes a
warranty of future performance under UCC § 2-725(2)). This Article answers the
question with a resounding ―no‖ and proposes a better approach to liability that will
provide additional protection for buyers while promoting market principles. See infra
Part VII.C.
65. This Article discusses scholarly arguments that either provide new legal
theories or extend existing statutory actions for misattribution and mistaken
provenance claims. For an excellent discussion of another means of addressing the
problem that does not involve generating new legal theories or extending existing
statutory claims see Leonard D. DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and
Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973, 1016–21 (1976) (discussing potential prophylactic
measures such as registration and self-policing).
66. See infra Part III.A.
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authenticity.67 As a derivative of this theory, the third
proposal is to create quasi-strict liability for auction houses.68
A. The Agency or Fiduciary Theory and the Presumption of
Buyer Reliance
One theory for imposing additional liability on art
merchants for a mistake in authentication is to establish a
fiduciary or principal-agent relationship between art
merchants and buyers.69 The theory applies the standard
when buyers reasonably regard merchants as acting on their
behalf and cases would thus vary according to the relative
knowledge and experience of the buyers.70 Proponents of this
theory recognize that the auction house already has a
fiduciary or principal-agent relationship with the art seller.71
Proponents acknowledge this conflict of interest72 and address
it primarily by pointing to ―unusual cases‖ where courts found
auction houses to be agents of purchasers.73
B. The Strict Liability Theory in Contract or in Tort
Scholars also advocate a strict liability theory74 that would
apply either to a breach of warranty claim or to a tort claim. 75
Scholars primarily delineate the elements of the theory in a
transactional framework76 by proposing the automatic
67. See infra Part III.B.
68. See infra Part III.C.
69. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 557–59; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 450–51.
70. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 559.
71. Id. at 557–58; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 450–51. In part, the theory is
concerned with the concept of the ―secret seller‖ or situations where a buyer will be left
without legal recourse for breach of contract when the consignor is known to the
auction house only. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 554 n.261.
72. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 558; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 450.
73. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 558–59 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1970); Romani v. Harris, 255 Md. 389, 394–97 (Md.
1969)). They also analogize the theory to real estate transactions where a broker is
only an agent for the seller, but may be held to be an agent for the buyer as well.
Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 558; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 450.
74. See Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2023–28; Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 559–66;
see also Singer, supra note 1, at 451–53 (discussing and critiquing the application of the
strict liability theory to the art market).
75. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 561.
76. Id.; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 1984 (describing strict liability theory as
the rationale supporting the holding of Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990)). Scholarly delineation of the elements in tort law simply
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creation of an express warranty for seller affirmations
regarding authenticity.77 The theory eliminates the opinionfact distinction and seller qualifications.78
The theory
potentially allows for disclaimers, but requires their
placement within the description or attribution of a piece.79
The primary rationale of the theory is cost allocation whereby
sellers can absorb the cost of mistakes in authenticity by
acquiring additional insurance80 and by spreading the cost of
the premiums among buyers.81
C. The Quasi-Strict Liability Theory and the Allowance of
Qualifications
The quasi-strict liability approach is narrower since it
allows for qualifications.82 The theory creates a rebuttable
presumption of seller liability based on the relative knowledge
of the buyer.83 However, the quasi-strict liability approach is
includes reference to a proposed section of the Second Restatement of Torts entitled
―Misrepresentation of Seller of Chattels to Public.‖ Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 561
n.287 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552D (1977) (Council Draft No. 17, at
76 (1963)). At least one scholar proposes the theory following a general discussion of
negligent misrepresentation claims. See Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2011.
77. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 563 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
442.322(2)(a)–(b); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01(a)). The theory only applies to
transactions between a merchant and a non-merchant. Id. at 562. The theory applies
to all affirmations of authenticity, including date and provenance. Id. at 563. Scholars
advocate this approach while acknowledging that the majority of art merchants act in
good faith and to the best of their ability to authenticate and attribute works. See
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 452.
78. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 563–65.
79. Id. at 564. The theory negates a single disclaimer placed in the beginning of
the catalogue and would also likely negate a single disclaimer placed in the Conditions
of Sale. See id. One interpretation of the theory negates all disclaimers. See id.
(discussing true strict liability with an example negating all disclaimers); see also
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 1984 (describing strict liability theory as the rationale
supporting the holding of Balog); Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72 (authentication is
automatic warranty of future performance under UCC § 2-725(2)).
80. Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024–25. Scholars insist that ―while the amount of
the loss may be staggering, the actual premium would be a small percentage of the
price.‖ Id.
81. Id.; Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 562; see also Singer, supra note 1, at 451.
The other two rationales are that strict liability encourages accident prevention, see
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024; Singer, supra note 1, at 451, and that proving fault or
negligence is ―antiquated,‖ Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024, ―expensive,‖ id.; Singer,
supra note 1, at 451, or ―overly burdensome.‖ Id. at 451.
82. Singer, supra note 1, at 453–55.
83. Id. The presumption would be applicable ―even in cases where the original
attribution was consistent with generally accepted opinion and authenticating

TOBIN_FINE ART

348

7/29/2011 10:51 AM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 21.2

broader in that it definitively negates all disclaimers
irrespective of their location84 and mandates an ―extremely
broad warranty along with high attribution standards.‖85
Scholars rely on The European Fine Art Fair at Maastricht
and England‘s Grosvenor House Fair,86 which adopt high
authentication standards, guarantee authenticity,87 and
demand the highest prices.88 The fairs undertake expansive
insurance policies89 and allocate these costs by passing the
additional premiums onto consumers.90
IV. SCHOLARS ALSO PROPOSE THE APPLICATION OF
SECURITIES LAWS TO PROTECT CONSIGNORS AND THIS
ARGUMENT CAN ADJUST TO PROTECT BUYERS
Additional theories may also be available pursuant to
securities regulations. Art has investment value and is
sensitive to market fluctuations.91 For this reason, scholars
propose the application of securities regulations by requiring
auction houses to owe duties of due diligence and disclosure to
consignors of artwork.92 A logical adjustment of the argument
is to impose these requirements on sellers and consignees in
order to protect fine art purchasers.93
A. The Investment Value of Art
Art has investment value.94 People often use art to hedge
against inflation.95 There are a number of indexes that
measure the art market.96 For example, the Mei/Moses Fine
Art Index tracks the repeated sale of art at auction houses. 97
This index outperformed the Hedge Fund Research Composite
standards‖ and its rebuttal is based on buyer art expertise. Id. at 454.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id. at 453 n.104; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2026.
87. Singer, supra note 1, at 453; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2027.
88. Singer, supra note 1, at 453; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2026.
89. Singer, supra note 1, at 453; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2026–27.
90. Singer, supra note 1, at 453 n.104; see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2027.
91. See infra Part IV.A.
92. See infra Part IV.B.
93. See infra Part IV.C.
94. DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1 to -9.
95. Id. at J-1.
96. See id. at J-6.
97. Id.
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Index by approximately three percent in 2005.98 Yet the
market fluctuates.99 These factors raise the question of the
applicability of securities laws to artwork.100
B. Imposing Securities Laws on Auction Houses to Protect
Consignors
Scholars argue that securities regulations can protect
consignors of artwork by requiring auction houses to adhere
to an underwriter‘s duty of due diligence and disclosure.101
The argument analogizes the sale of artwork at an auction
house to the issuance of securities through an underwriter,102
which may constitute an initial public offering (IPO).103 The
analogy compares the role of the auction house to the role of
an underwriter.104 It compares the role of the consignors to
investors.105 The argument seeks to enhance auction house
duties of due diligence and disclosure to the seller.106
The argument analogizes the appraisal and authentication
process to an underwriter‘s due diligence in assessing the
financial and operational condition of the issuer.107 The
auction house would furnish a truthful opinion as to the value
of the piece.108 The auction house would be required to keep
the consignor informed regarding any material changes that
might affect their relationship or the decision to sell at
auction.109 An auction house, like an underwriter, would
incur liability for a breach of due diligence and disclosure
duties to the consignor.110
98. Id. at J-6 to -7.
99. See id. at J-5 to -6 (noting a late 1980‘s bubble pop in the art market).
100. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-27.
101. Reginald Bullock, Jr., Imposing the Underwriters’ Duty of Care on Art
Auctioneers, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 360–61 (1989).
102. Id. at 361.
103. See 1 LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 485 n.1 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter
1 LOSS] (noting that in 2002 the SEC reviewed 610 IPOs composing approximately $2
trillion in securities). IPOs and public offerings generally are handled via underwriting
syndicates whose underwriters consist of major financial institutions. Id. at 500, 505.
These syndicates are typically run by a managing underwriter. Id. at 500.
104. Bullock, supra note 101, at 361.
105. Id. at 361 n.15.
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id. at 383–84.
108. Id. at 385.
109. See id. at 384–85.
110. The argument contends that the liability would be easier to establish if it were
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C. Imposing Securities Laws on Art Sellers and
Consignees to Protect Buyers
Since the purpose of securities regulations is to protect
investors,111 a logical adjustment of the argument applies the
analogy to art buyers.112 The extension would compare a
seller and an auction house to an issuer and an underwriter,
respectively.113 The argument would still involve accurate
authentication and valuation of a piece, which is analogous to
an underwriter‘s due diligence and valuation of a security.114
The disclosure requirements would involve conveying any
material facts contributing to the assessment of authenticity
to art purchasers as an analogue to an issuer‘s disclosure
requirements to prospective investors.115 Art sellers and
auction houses would thus owe duties of due diligence and
disclosure to art buyers.116
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(―the ‘34 Act‖) could provide additional protection to art
purchasers.117 Section 10(b) can provide more temporal
protection than a breach of warranty claim because it
includes the ―discovery rule‖ as opposed to an automatic
accrual at tender of delivery.118 Even in actions where the
akin to liability in the securities context. See Bullock, supra note 101, at 383–84. In
drawing the analogy, the argument relies heavily on the continuous disclosure policy of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as well as section 11 actions and defenses. Id.
at 384 n.167, 361 n.20.
111. See 1 LOSS, supra note 103, at 4 (―[T]he problems at which modern securities
regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers.‖).
112. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-6 (questioning whether
securities regulations should protect the art purchaser).
113. See 1 LOSS, supra note 103, at 327 (Securities Act of 1933 (―the ‘33 Act‖)
concerned with initial distribution of securities). The seller is analogous to the issuer,
which acquires funds through the sale. See id. The argument therefore extends to
dealers either because they are analogous to issuers or because they are analogous to
firm commitment underwriters who assume distribution risk. See id. at 492–94.
Auction house sales via consignment, on the other hand, are comparable to best efforts
underwriting where the underwriters do not purchase the securities. See id. at 525.
114. See, e.g., id. at 499–500 (managing underwriters‘ letter of intent typically
includes a contemplated price range or mechanism for determining the price of the
securities); Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at 834 (appraisal depends on authenticity).
115. See 1 LOSS, supra note 103, at 4 (securities laws protect against seller avarice).
116. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226, 231–32 (1988) (underwriter
owes duties of due diligence and disclosure to purchasers of securities).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (section 10(b) of the ‗34 Act prohibits manipulation
or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a security).
118. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) (2006) (section 10(b) claims can be brought two
years from the time of discovery of facts constituting the violation), with U.C.C. § 2-

TOBIN_FINE ART

7/29/2011 10:51 AM

2011] Common Law and Disclosures in the Market for Fine Art

351

limitations period is not of concern, section 10(b) can expand
liability by barring fewer claims for factual reasons.119
Section 10(b) could potentially dismiss fewer claims than
common law fraud because its intent requirement is
equivalent to gross recklessness,120 which eases the burden of
725(2) (1995) (statute of limitations accrues upon tender of delivery), and N.Y. U.C.C. §
2-725(2) (McKinney 2011) (statute of limitations accrues upon tender of delivery). But
see U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2004) (―discovery rule‖ in breach of contract actions). Section
10(b) is the theory of choice because other enforcement provisions either provide less
temporal protection, see 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (filing periods for violation of sections
12(a)(1) and (2) of the ‗34 Act are respectively capped at three years from bona fide
offerings and sales), or are only applicable to registered securities in addition to
providing less temporal protection. See id. § 77k (section 11 of the ‗33 Act imposes
liability for material misstatements or omissions in an effective registration statement);
§ 77m (section 11 limitations period capped at three years from bona fide offerings).
While an auction house catalogue of sale or an art dealer‘s other means of written
communication is analogous to a prospectus, see id. § 77b(a)(10) (defining prospectus),
section 11 of the ‗33 Act, see § 77k, could not provide an alternative pleading because an
art merchant‘s sales materials do not constitute an effective registration statement.
See id. § 77f(a)(8) (defining registration statement); see also id. § 77g(a) (registration
statement shall be accompanied by documents in Schedule A and Schedule B); 17
C.F.R. §§ 210, 229 (listing disclosure requirements of regulations S–X and S–K
necessary for a registration statement). Section 10(b) is not limited to registered
securities and provides better protection. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
119. Compare United States v. Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 741 (1997) (liability for
fiduciary‘s material nondisclosure of non-public information), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 528–529, 550–551 (1977) (common law fraud liability for
ambiguous and incomplete statements requires intention to mislead and for
nondisclosures typically requires defendant concealment of information, intentional
action to prevent plaintiff from acquiring information, or a special relationship with
plaintiff invoking a duty to disclose). See also U.C.C. § 2-313 (2004) (warranty
provisions do not mention nondisclosure as forming a ―basis for the bargain‖). But see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 739 (noting ―amorphous tendency‖ of some courts to
require ―what the ordinary ethical person‖ would disclose); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 539(2) (liability for implied statements of fact made pursuant to
an expression of opinion coupled with nondisclosure of known incompatible facts).
120. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (―We need not
address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under [section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5‖); Kushner v. Beverley
Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2003); City of Phila. v. Fleming Co., Inc., 264
F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001); Philips v. LCI Int‘l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir.
1999) (scienter requirement may be shown by recklessness); Hoffman v. Comshare, Inc.
(In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 542, 549–50 (6th Cir. 1999) (scienter
requires pleading facts supporting a strong inference of recklessness); SEC v. Carriba
Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Broad v. Rockwell Int‘l Corp.,
642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190,
1198 (3d. Cir. 1979) (―[R]eckless disregard for its truth or falsity.‖); Hoffman v.
Estabrook & Co., Inc., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978) (approving jury instruction of
―carelessness approaching indifference‖); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570
F.2d 38, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1978) (willful or reckless disregard); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
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pleading specific intent.121 Section 10(b) can provide middle
ground between breach of warranty and common law fraud.122
V. THE PROPOSED THEORIES DO NOT SUPPLEMENT
PROTECTION IN A SIGNIFICANT MANNER AND WILL
DISRUPT THE MARKET FOR FINE ART
The imposition of a fiduciary relationship between auction
houses and buyers will not appropriately supplement buyer
protection and its conflict of interest is of clear concern.123
Any additional benefit to buyers under the strict liability
approach is marginal at best and the theory will generate
illiquidity.124 The same is true for the quasi-strict liability
approach, which evidently is prone to merchant insolvency.125
A. Contract Law Presumes Buyer Reliance and the Agency
or Fiduciary Theory Creates a Substantial Conflict of
Interest
Components of the fiduciary theory provide less protection
than the common law and the theory generally conflicts with
well-established legal principles. With respect to the reliance
element, the fiduciary theory provides less protection than the
UCC because it requires the buyer to demonstrate a
reasonable belief of an agency relationship126 whereas breach
of warranty presumes buyer reliance on a seller‘s
affirmations.127 The theory also stands contrary to well1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
121. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1020–25 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS] (section 10(b)
scienter less demanding than that of common law deceit).
122. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. While both the common law
and the securities laws provide for rescission and damages, section 10(b) has the
potential to expand greatly the measure of damages. See LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS, supra
note 121, at 1185–87, 1285–87 (common law and section 10(b) respectively measure
damages at the time of the delivery and the time of the action).
123. See infra Part V.A.
124. See infra Part V.B.
125. See infra Part V.C.
126. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 559.
127. U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 5 (2004) (―In actual practice affirmations of fact made by
the seller about goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particular reliance need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement.‖). Though the presumption of buyer reliance, see § 2-313,
negates the concern of scholars for knowledge asymmetry, see Gerstenblith, supra note
1, at 559, some courts still discuss relative knowledge in assessing reliance. See Balog

TOBIN_FINE ART

7/29/2011 10:51 AM

2011] Common Law and Disclosures in the Market for Fine Art

353

established principles because an auction house rarely
assents to buyer control, and fiduciary obligations result from
agent assent to control generating the potential for principal
liability due to agent conduct.128
As an agent of the
consignor,129 the auction house owes a duty of loyalty to the
seller.130 Consequently, it must place the seller‘s interests
above even its own.131
v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (D. Haw. 1990) (pointing to
superior expertise of art seller when discussing buyer reliance); Firestone & Parson,
Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting plaintiffs
were art dealers); see also De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan, (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1004,
1005 (pointing to relative knowledge in determining reliance). While the imposition of
a fiduciary relationship theoretically provides the added protection of liability for
omissions in a deceit action, this provision is limited to ―matters known‖ to the party
under the duty, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977) (fiduciary
relationship requires disclosure of matters known), and thus does not supplement
liability in practice because breach of warranty simply requires mistaken
authentication. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 5 (―The issue normally is one of fact.‖); see also
Greenberg Gallery, Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 169–71 (D.D.C. 1993) (no liability
when piece‘s distinguishing characteristics were a result of damage done in transit by
purchaser and not indicative of mistaken authenticity); Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463
F. Supp. 461, 467–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (liability for a piece when opposing expert
conceded it may have been misattributed and no liability for another piece when all
experts agreed upon authenticity); Power v. Barham, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 865, 866
(breach where expert testimony unequivocally found a misattribution); Jendwine v.
Slade, (1797) 170 Eng. Rep. 459, 459 (no breach where expert testimony conflicted).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt b (2006) (―An agent assents to act
subject to the principal‘s control and on the principal‘s behalf.‖); id. § 8.11 cmt. b
(―Within an agency relationship, an agent assents to act subject to the principal‘s
control.‖); see also id. (―An agent‘s duty to provide information to the principal
facilitates the principal‘s exercise of control over the agent.‖). Due to this lack of
control, the theory cannot supplement temporal protection by tolling the statute of
limitations in a buyer‘s negligence action against a seller. See Wilson v. Hammer, 850
F.2d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 1988) (refusing to toll limitations period in buyer negligence claim
against auction house by distinguishing the action from legal malpractice claim in
Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83 (1974), where attorney-client relationship invoked
fiduciary duties). If the theory allowed tolling, it would then be subject to the same
policy concerns as the strict liability and quasi-strict liability approaches. See infra
notes 152–156, 161–166 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods, Int‘l, Inc., 117 A.D. 284,
292 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (―The Auctioneer is the agent of the consignor.‖).
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (agent has fiduciary duty to act
loyally on the principal‘s behalf in all matters connected with the agency relationship);
see also Steven Mark Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for Professional Malpractice, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 595, 609 (1991) [hereinafter Levy, Liability] (Maastricht vetting committee
disclaimer states that it acts solely for the benefit of the Fair).
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (Duty of loyalty requires
agent to ―put the principal‘s interests first as to matters connected with the agency‖); cf.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (standard of conduct among joint
adventurers is a ―punctilio‖ of honor). While proponents of the theory express fear of
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The theory therefore generates policy concerns based on
the old adage: ―No one can serve two masters.‖ 132 Scholars
rely on ―unusual cases‖ to circumvent the conflict of interest
inherent in the theory.133
Yet these cases dealt with
situations where the auction house signed the sales
agreement on behalf of the highest bidder preceding a suit by
the seller for non-payment.134 The net result of these cases
was to honor the auction house‘s fiduciary duty of loyalty to
the seller by placing the interests of the seller above those of
the buyer.135 The better approach is for a buyer to seek the
advice of an independent appraiser.136
the ―secret seller,‖ Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 554 n.261, this fear subsides under
current agency law‘s approach to unidentified and undisclosed principles.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.02(1)–(2), 6.03(1)–(2), 7.01, 7.04, 7.08 (agent
conduct creates liability in contract and tort for unidentified or undisclosed principal);
see also, id. §§ 2.05–2.06(1) (estoppel in absence of apparent authority and general
liability of undisclosed principal).
132. Matthew 6:24.
133. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 558–59 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970); Romani v. Harris, 255 Md. 389, 394–97 (1969)).
134. The first case primarily dealt with the issue of personal jurisdiction. See ParkeBernet, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (reversing motion to dismiss by holding that out-of-state
bidder‘s participation in auction sale over the phone established sufficient contacts
within the state for personal jurisdiction). The court secondarily relied on the concept
of agency to establish sufficient contacts within the state, but narrowly held that the
employee of the auctioneer was an agent when ―loaned‖ to the buyer for the purposes of
transmitting bids over the phone and expressly stated that the auctioneer itself was not
an agent. Id. The second case narrowly held that the auction house could act as an
agent for the highest bidder in signing a sale memorandum pursuant to a provision in
the state‘s Statute of Frauds. Romani, 255 Md. at 393. Neither case dealt with an
agency relationship beyond the scope of binding a remorseful buyer attempting to back
out of a deal. See Parke-Bernet, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 339; Romani, 255 Md. at 390.
135. See Parke-Bernet, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341; Romani, 255 Md. at 393; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (―[Agent must] put the principal‘s
interests first as to matters connected with the agency.‖). Support from the real estate
analogy is equally limited since modern transactions typically involve an extra broker
representing the buyer. See FILMORE W. GALATY ET AL., MODERN REAL ESTATE
PRACTICE 92 (16th ed. 2003) (discussing buyer agency agreements); ROGER BERNHARDT
& ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUT SHELL 298 (6th ed. 2010) (buyer broker
agreement is modern response to court treatment of buyer broker as seller sub-agent).
136. See Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1990) (―Requiring a
purchaser to obtain [an] appraisal from an expert other than the seller is not an
onerous burden‖); Wilson v. Hammer, 850 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (―[Plaintiffs] easily
could have discovered the problem from the outset by means of a second expert
opinion.‖); see also Levy, Liability, supra note 130, at 635 (two of the three major
appraisers in the United States hold themselves out as fiduciaries to their clients).
This approach would also benefit buyers because it has the potential to eliminate
agency cost on the buy-side. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b
(interests of agent not always aligned with interests of principal); cf. Michael C. Jensen
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B. Contract Law Does Not Require a Showing of Intent
and the Strict Liability Theory Reduces Buyer Access
―Strict liability‖ in its true legal sense is applicable to tort
law.137 The application of the doctrine via tort law will not
increase buyer protection because contract law does not
require proof of intent138 and a breach of warranty claim often
has a greater limitations period than a tort claim.139 The
application of the ―strict liability theory‖ via contract law will
also fail to supplement buyer protection because negating the
opinion defense for a warranty of attribution140 is unnecessary
under the UCC, which equates an opinion with a fact if it
forms ―the basis of the bargain.‖141 Since the presence of
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (discussing agency cost in
organizations); 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, FRIEDMAN ON
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1:3, at 1-10 to -11 (7th ed. 2005)
(broker‘s bias to closing transaction reflected in real estate forms). By hiring their own
independent appraisers, buyers can structure the relationship on a fee-for-service basis
without a closing commission. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b
(principals can align interests with agents). Caution is essential as some ―experts‖ may
present themselves as consultants and function as dealers. See Levy, Liability, supra
note 130, at 635 (citing Fenton v. Friedman, 748 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984)).
137. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009) (―[Strict liability is liability]
that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the
breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. Strict liability most often applies
either to ultrahazardous activities or in products-liability cases.‖). Scholars note this
limitation and further highlight that it typically applies to ―inherently defective and
unreasonably dangerous‖ products causing personal injury or property damage.
Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 560.
138. U.C.C. § 2-313(3) (2004); see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 44, at 176 (―[T]he
law does not actually require a promisor to keep his promise, but instead treats the
payment of money damages as a wholly adequate remedy for breach.‖).
Yet
demonstrating a breach of the standard of care is necessary for negligence actions. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1977); see also id. § 299A (standard of care in
professional liability); id. § 552(1) (standard of care in negligent misrepresentation).
139. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-725 (West 2010) (statute of limitations
for UCC action is four years), with id. ch. 260, § 2A (statute of limitations for tort action
is three years). See also U.C.C. § 2-725 (2004) (―discovery rule‖ for sale of goods subject
to five-year statute of repose); Levy, Liability, supra note 130, at 627 (UCC § 2-725 is
one of the most formidable statute of limitations for mistaken authentication claims).
140. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 563–65. Scholars rely on a state statute
governing art transactions to support this assertion. Id. at 563 (citing N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03(1)).
141. U.C.C. § 2-313(2)(a); see also § 2-313(2) cmt. 10 (opinions are representations
that ―cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain‖). Even if a seller relied on
the opinion-fact distinction under UCC § 2-313(2)(a), the buyer could easily argue that
the authentication constituted a ―description of the goods‖ that was part of ―the basis of
the bargain.‖ § 2-313(2)(b). A description is technically not subject to the opinion
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authenticity in the bargain is usually self-evident,142 the
primary question will still be whether or not the authenticity
was mistaken.143 Like the UCC,144 the theory also allows
reasonable disclaimers to limit or negate warranties.145 The
defense and under each subsection the question is whether or not authenticity was a
―basis of the bargain.‖ § 2-313(2)(a)–(b).
142. See Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at 834 (authenticity and provenance are
important factors in appraising the value of artwork); DARRABY, supra note 1, § 4:19, at
239 (―If on occasion authorship drops out of the bargain, a huge and palpable price
differential would be apparent.‖); id. § 2:58, at 88 (―Certain prior owners or events may
effectively enhance value by providing the artworks with a cachet.‖); see also Lomi v.
Tucker, (1829) 172 Eng. Rep. 586, 588 (jury flatly rejects seller defense based on price).
143. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 5 (2004) (―The issue normally is one of fact.‖); see also
Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts Inc., No. 93 C 4147, 1996 WL 563442, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996) (authenticity is the least appropriate issue for summary
judgment when both sides present experts with opposite views); Greenberg Gallery, Inc.
v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 169–71 (D.D.C. 1993) (no liability when piece‘s
distinguishing characteristics were a result of damage done in transit by purchaser and
not indicative of mistaken authenticity); Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461,
467–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (liability for a piece when opposing expert conceded it may have
been misattributed and no liability for another piece when all experts agreed upon
authenticity); Power v. Barham, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 865, 866 (breach where expert
testimony unequivocally found a misattribution); Jendwine v. Slade, (1797) 170 Eng.
Rep. 459, 459 (no breach where expert testimony conflicted).
144. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004) (―Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an
express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other . . . . [N]egation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.‖); id. § 2313 cmt. 6 (―In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to
determine what it is the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of
those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material
deletion of the seller‘s obligation.‖).
145. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 56. Similarly, the New York Arts and
Cultural Affairs Law construes disclaimers reasonably with warranties. N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03(4)(a) (McKinney 2011). While the New York statute has
provisions that specify when a disclaimer with respect to authenticity is unreasonable,
it considers the representations of authenticity at the time of the sale or exchange and
judicial application of the statute asks whether the authenticity had a ―reasonable basis
in fact.‖ See § 13.03(4)(b)(iii); Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 467 (case decided under
predecessor to Arts & Cultural Affairs Law). These additional requirements may
provide less protection than the UCC since warranty liability is merely dependent on
authenticity forming ―a basis of the bargain.‖ U.C.C. § 2-313(2)(a)–(b). Similarly,
criticism of Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. ought not to be directed at the UCC or
the common law. 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev’d 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App.
Term 1974) (per curiam). The controversial case denied a warranty claim after New
York‘s adoption of the UCC because prior statutory law emphasizing caveat emptor
controlled the action due to the timing of the sale. See id. at 583; see also Weisz, 351
N.Y.S.2d at 912. Perhaps the trial judge was more lenient in considering the UCC as a
benchmark than the appeals court. DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-91; see
also id. at K-94 (discussing Robert Miller Gallery, Inc. v. Shepard Gallery Assocs., Inc.,
6 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1076 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1988), where the UCC provided for rescission
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UCC approach already protects buyers by finding liability
based on the terms of the deal.146
The theory also stands contrary to well-established legal
principles. In addition to the limited applicability of strict
liability to inherently dangerous products,147 the theory could
only toll the filing period for negligence by undermining the
requirement of a fiduciary relationship.148 Similarly, an
interpretation of the theory that negates reasonable
disclaimers and holds merchants liable indefinitely will
substantially limit the freedom of contract of parties.149
Warranties and disclaimers are fundamental parts of contract
law, which focuses on the ability of parties to reach a
―bargain.‖150 Merchants are free to warrant or disclaim goods
based on mistaken authentication for a case between merchants and thus falling
outside of New York‘s Arts & Cultural Affairs Law).
146. U.C.C. §§ 2-313(2), 2-316(1); see also DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at
K-93 (Illinois rejects attempt to adopt specific legislation for art transactions due to
adequacy of UCC coverage). The paradox that becomes apparent when contrasting
UCC § 2-316(1) with UCC § 2-313(2) will result in a natural resolution in each case
depending on the relevant facts and opposing counsels‘ respective ability to assert what
was or was not ―a basis of the bargain.‖ § 2-313 cmt. 10.
147. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 560. This concession couples proponent
acknowledgement that the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts did not adopt
the proposed section addressing misrepresentations by sellers of chattels. Id. at 561
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552D (1977) (Council Draft No. 17, at 76
(1963)). Both points stand against the application of the theory even in jurisdictions
where a negligence action has a greater limitations period than breach of warranty.
See, e.g., Bernier v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 543 (Me. 1986) (Maine allows
physical manifestation of injury to accrue six-year limitations period in asbestos cases).
The application of the theory to a negligent misrepresentation claim is equally
inappropriate because the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts limited this pure
economic loss claim by including a specific intent requirement with respect to a limited
class of persons and transactions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2); see
also JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 61–62 (3d ed. 2007)
(discussing intent and knowledge requirement limitations under section 552).
148. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hammer, 850 F.2d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 1988) (refusing to toll
limitations period in buyer negligence claim against auction house by distinguishing
the action from legal malpractice claim in Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83 (1974),
where attorney-client relationship invoked fiduciary duties).
149. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing true strict liability with an
example negating all disclaimers); see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 1984 (describing
strict liability theory as the rationale supporting the holding of Balog v. Ctr. Art
Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990)); Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72
(holding art authentication automatically constitutes an express warranty of future
performance under UCC § 2-725(2)). The same is true for interpretations of the theory
that expand its scope beyond attribution to all components of authentication and
provenance. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 563 (asserting that the doctrine could
apply to all components of authenticity, including provenance and the date of the piece).
150. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (―This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they
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pursuant to acceptable legal standards and buyers are free to
negotiate terms or select different sellers.151
There is also a strong policy argument against the theory
because it will have the net effect of decreasing buyer access.
To the extent the theory allows disclaimers and is only
applicable in sales to non-merchants,152 sellers may either
refuse to authenticate pieces, fully disclaim warranties of
authenticity, or be disinclined to sell certain pieces to nonmerchant buyers.153 To the extent the theory provides for
indefinite art merchant liability,154 the cost allocation
rationale behind the theory will increase prices. 155 Either
consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish.‖). Buyers are free to
negotiate for or to select a seller providing an unequivocal guarantee and merchants are
free to set an acceptable price for or to decline to extend such a guarantee. Cf.
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2026–27 (discussing how European fairs providing unlimited
guarantees have the highest prices). The law entitles autonomous individuals to the
benefit of the bargain. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6.
151. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (―[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to
determine what it is the seller has in essence agreed to sell . . . .‖). Contract law also
does not require the placement of disclaimers of express warranties in a particular
location.
But cf. id. § 2-316(2) (disclaimers excluding implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness must be conspicuous). A disclaimer specifically mentioning
attribution at the beginning of a catalogue as a component of the conditions of sale is
enforceable because the buyer is deemed to be on notice. See § 2-316 cmt. 1. Requiring
a disclaimer in the description of each piece, see Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 56,
would not only be overly redundant, but would also, to put it gently, reduce the
aesthetic appeal of catalogues that typically display upwards of a hundred pieces. See
generally Christie‘s, Fine American Paintings, Drawings and Sculpture, NEW YORK
SALE 2342, Sept. 28, 2010 (151 pages with 278 lots).
152. See Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2023–28; Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 559–66
see also Singer, supra note 1, at 451–53 (discussing and critiquing the application of the
strict liability theory to the art market).
153. These potential results are particularly true for antiquities where
authentication is inherently speculative. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at
K-25 (establishing authenticity of aged pieces with 100% certainty ―is difficult even
under the most favorable circumstances‖). However, these potential results are less
likely to occur in jurisdictions that bridle the elimination of the opinion defense with a
requirement that the seller‘s representations had no ―reasonable basis in fact.‖ Balog,
745 F. Supp. at 1566; Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
154. See Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing true strict liability with an
example negating a disclaimer); see also Jauregui, supra note 4, at 1984 (describing
strict liability theory as the rationale supporting the holding of Balog); Balog, 745 F.
Supp. at 1569–72 (holding art authentication constitutes an express warranty of future
performance under UCC § 2-725(2)).
155. See Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024–25; Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 562; see
also Singer, supra note 1, at 451. A fundamental principle of economics is that an
increase in price corresponds with a decrease in demand. See WALTER J. WESSELS,
ECONOMICS 32 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the law of demand). This principle is
exponentially true for elastic goods and luxury goods involve greater price elasticity.
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result will decrease liquidity as well as access for nonmerchant or unsophisticated buyers.156
C. Contract Law Allows for Qualifications and the QuasiStrict Liability Theory Generates Merchant Insolvency
Many of the provisions of the quasi-strict liability theory
do not supplement buyer protection and others contradict
well-established legal principles. The theory‘s allowance of
qualifications157 is already a component of the UCC, which
limits liability to the extent the qualifications become a ―basis
of the bargain.‖158 The theory also does not supplement buyer
protection in ways similar to the other theories, including its
rebuttable presumption and focus on intent.159 Moreover, its
Id. at 294, 302. Though scholars insist that the ―staggering‖ losses will only generate
insurance premiums that are ―a small percentage of the price,‖ Jauregui, supra note 4,
at 2024–25, the veracity of this assertion is questionable given the tendency of
insurance companies to concern themselves with shareholder profits. See, e.g., DUBOFF
& HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at L-3 (policy premiums from stock companies
incorporate payment of share holder dividends). Even assuming the truth of the
assertion, this ―small percentage of the price‖ may impose substantial hardship on
merchants for reasons discussed in the critique of the quasi-strict liability theory below.
See infra notes 162–166 and accompanying text. Finally, insurance companies are
demonstrating an increasingly smaller appetite for risk, which may limit the ability to
acquire such insurance. See, e.g., DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at L-1
(discussing negative impact of hurricane Katrina on art insurance market).
156. See WESSELS, supra note 155, at 114 (aggregate demand decreases when price
level rises). The rationale that strict liability encourages accident prevention, see
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024; Singer, supra note 1, at 451, is unjustifiable not only
because the doctrine typically applies to ―inherently defective and unreasonably
dangerous‖ products that cause personal injury or property damage, Gerstenblith,
supra note 1, at 560, but also because it contradicts scholarly acknowledgement that
merchants make a good faith effort to authenticate works. See Jauregui, supra note 4,
at 2024; Singer, supra note 1, at 452. Similarly, there are enumerable responses to the
contention that proving negligence is ―overly burdensome,‖ Singer, supra note 1, at 451,
―expensive,‖ id.; Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2024, or ―antiquated.‖ Id. The responses
include, inter alia, that breach of warranty does not require proof of intent, see U.C.C. §
2-313(3) (2004); CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 44, at 176, negligence is the lowest standard
of intent, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1977), the burden or cost of its
proof is marginal given the requirement of expert testimony to establish a mistake in
authentication, see supra note 143 and accompanying text, and antiquated legal
principles often carry greater authority as exemplified by the principle of stare decisis.
See, e.g., Osborne v. IRS (In re Osborne), 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (the common
law principle of stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quieta movere or ―to stand
by and adhere to decisions and not disturb what is settled‖).
157. See Singer, supra note 1, at 454 (quasi-strict liability allows qualifications like
―probable‖ or ―perhaps‖).
158. U.C.C. §§ 2-313(2)–(3), 2-316(1) (2004).
159. Even though the theory‘s rebuttable presumption considers the relative
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―very broad warranty‖ and negation of disclaimers160 stand
contrary to well-established legal principles by substantially
limiting freedom of contract.161
This limitation creates equally substantial policy concerns.
The theory will increase the cost of insurance premiums for
sellers, which will result in higher prices for buyers or even
merchant insolvency.162 Most notably, the Maastricht Fair
and the Grosvenor House Fair have met with disparate
results.163 The Grosvenor House Fair, after seventy-five years
knowledge of the parties, see Singer, supra note 1, at 453–54, it does not add anything
to a breach of warranty claim. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 10 (2004) (―Concerning
affirmations of value or a seller‘s opinion or commendation under subsection (3), the
basic question remains the same: What statements of the seller have become part of the
basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the seller do so unless
good reason is shown to the contrary.‖) (emphasis added). But see Balog v. Ctr. Art
Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (D. Haw. 1990) (pointing to superior
expertise of art seller when discussing reliance); De Sewhanberg v. Buchanan, (1832)
172 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1005 (noting relative knowledge when discussing reliance).
Applying the presumption even when ―attribution was consistent with generally
accepted opinion and authenticating standards,‖ Singer, supra note 1, at 454, also does
not supplement protection since a warranty claim does not necessitate proof of standard
of care, or of negligent intent, or of any intent generally. See U.C.C. § 2-313(3) (2004);
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 44, at 176.
160. Singer, supra note 1, at 454.
161. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (allowing specific disclaimers of express warranties); see also
§ 2-313 cmt. 6 (―[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is
the seller has in essence agreed to sell . . . .‖). The same can be said for its mandatory
imposition of ―rigorous attribution standards.‖ Singer, supra note 1, at 454. With
respect to the negotiations themselves, the limitation on freedom of contract for buyers
under both the strict and quasi-strict liability theories appears minor in the auction
house setting since these transactions are governed by the Conditions of Sale and
buyers only negotiate price. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781
(Del. Ch. 2006) (buyer control over bid price); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
28(2) (1981) (bid terms set by publications of which bidders are or should be aware).
Yet the limitation has substantial implications for buyers due to the fact that auction
houses often set minimum bid prices, see Olsoff, supra note 1, § 11.01[B][2][a], at 902,
and the theories will generate significant price increases. See supra notes 155–156 and
accompanying text; infra notes 162–166 and accompanying text.
162. See Singer, supra note 1, at 453 (quasi-strict liability results in higher
insurance premiums with costs spread among consumers); see also Jauregui, supra note
4, at 2024–27 (cost spreading to buyers in both quasi-strict liability and strict liability
theories); cf. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 562 (cost allocation to buyers under strict
liability theory). Scholars assert that the fairs providing the guarantee offset the
higher insurance costs with admission ticket revenues. See Singer, supra note 1, at 454
n.104; Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2027. Yet it is reasonable to infer that costs are also
offset by artwork transactions since these merchants receive the highest prices.
Jauregui, supra note 4, at 2026. Though ascertaining the exact mechanisms of
allocation is impossible without opening up the books of the merchants, it is clear that
the theory does not work for all merchants in practice.
163. Compare Roger Webster & Jason Grant, The European Fine Art Fair a
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of setting the standard for elegance and excellence, closed its
doors in 2009164 primarily because of insurance costs.165 If
voluntary adherence to these standards was impossible for a
world-renowned fair, their involuntary application will bring
down smaller, lesser-known merchants.166
VI. SECURITIES LAWS PROVIDE MARGINAL PROTECTION AND
WILL DISRUPT THE ART MARKET
In most situations, securities regulations fair no better. A
typical art transaction is not likely to constitute a
―security.‖167 Even if an art sale were a ―security,‖ section
10(b) would only provide marginal protection to buyers on
account of its statute of repose and reckless intent
standard.168 Moreover, the inclusion of art in the definition of
a ―security‖ will generate illiquidity.169

Smashing Success!, HAMPTONS, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.hamptons.com/The-Arts/
Top-Stories/10306/The-European-Fine-Art-Fair-A-Smashing-Success.html, with Deidre
Willar, Grosevnor House Antiques Fair Shuts Down, LUXIST, July 1, 2009,
http://www.luxist.com/2009/07/01/grosvenor-house-antiques-fair-shuts-down/.
The
Maastricht Fair continues to guarantee the authentication of some of the world‘s most
impressive pieces, see Webster & Grant, supra, pursuant to its exemplary vetting
process. See Buying with Confidence: Vetting, TEFAF MAASTRICHT, www.tefaf.com
(click on ―About TEFAF‖ then ―Buying With Confidence‖) (last visited March 28, 2010).
164. Press Release, The Grosvenor House, The Grosvenor House Art & Antiques
Fair Comes To An End After 75 Glorious Years (June 30, 2009), http://www.grosvenorantiquesfair.co.uk/fair_closure.html. The Chairman of the Fair was very candid
regarding the economic nature of the closure when he publicly stated: ―I quite
understand that it no longer makes financial sense to continue the Fair.‖ Id.
165. See Willar, supra note 163 (main reason for closure was rising cost of
insurance); see also note 155. Of course, the Grosvenor House‘s inability to pay its
insurance premiums or to remain operational raises the question of who will now
guarantee authenticity for its past transactions. See id. In other words, buyers ought
to be concerned with the insolvency of their merchants. See id.
166. At the bottom of this ―slippery slope‖ is the elimination of middle markets
where merchants providing limited warranties or mid-level vetting evaporate and only
buyers that can afford to fly to Europe to shop at Maastricht have access to
authenticated art. See William W. Stuart, Authenticity of Authorship and the Auction
Market, 54 ME. L. REV. 71, 83–93 (2002) (contrasting sale conditions at large and small
auction houses).
167. See infra Part VI.A.
168. See infra Part VI.B.
169. See infra Part VI.C.
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A. Arguing Art Is a “Security” Is Difficult for the Typical
Art Transaction
The ordinary sale of art is not likely to constitute an
―investment contract‖ under the Howey test, which requires
an ―investment‖ in a ―common enterprise‖ where the
purchaser expects profits from the ―efforts of others.‖170 An
art sale may fail the first prong of Howey because an
―investment‖ ordinarily precludes consumer goods.171 The
typical art sale would also not be a ―common enterprise‖
under ―horizontal commonality‖ or ―strict vertical
commonality.‖172 Success in a ―broad vertical commonality‖173
jurisdiction would still depend on the unlikely consideration
of substantially pre-purchase ―efforts of others‖ and a
derivation of value from past occurrences.174 Further, a court
may even find art is not an ―investment contract‖ without
ever applying Howey because it ―does not fall within the
ordinary concept of a security.‖175 This analysis, however,
does not extend beyond the scope of an ordinary art sale.176
The ordinary sale of art is not likely to constitute an
―investment.‖ The purchase of real or personal property for

170. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Since ―art‖ is not listed
under the definition of ―security‖ in either the ‘33 Act or the ‘34 Act, see 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1) (2006); id. § 78c(10), it may only constitute a ―security‖ under the term
―investment contract‖ in both acts. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. Courts have found an
―investment contract‖ in arrangements involving personal property that would
ordinarily be a less likely candidate for a ―security‖ than artwork. See, e.g., Miller v.
Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417–18 (8th Cir. 1974) (Howey test finds an
arrangement involving the sale of chinchillas to constitute an ―investment contract‖).
171. See Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975); Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81,
88 (2d Cir. 1994); Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994).
172. See 2 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 932–36 (4th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter 2 LOSS] (discussing the three types of ―commonality‖ capable of satisfying
the ―common enterprise‖ requirement).
173. See id. at 934 (defining ―broad vertical commonality‖).
174. Compare SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547–48 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(substantially pre-purchase ―efforts of others‖ do not qualify), with SEC v. Mut. Benefits
Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 744 (11th Cir. 2005) (considering substantially pre-purchase
―efforts of others‖) (citing Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting)). See also
Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985)
(secondary market-making ―efforts‖ relate to on-going and future occurrences).
175. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (quoting Int‘l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 (1979)).
176. But see, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1985)
(Howey is unnecessary when instrument possesses normal attributes of a ―stock‖).
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consumption does not satisfy the first prong of Howey177
unless the primary purpose of the transaction is an
―investment.‖178 The test for the primary purpose of the
transaction is usually objective and therefore focuses on the
conduct of the promoter and the manner of the offering. 179
Irrespective of the means of evaluating investment intent,
courts may very well require a pooling of funds from the
arrangement in order to transform the purchase of property
otherwise
associated
with
consumption
into
an
―investment.‖180
The typical art sale is not likely to become an
―investment.‖ The aesthetic value of art is undeniable and
the motivation behind an ordinary art transaction is
primarily consumption and secondarily ―investment.‖181
Under an objective analysis,182 the conduct of established art
merchants is likely to reflect this priority of motivations
177. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 858 (no ―investment contract‖ for sale of stock in
residential co-op).
178. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(―investment contract‖ for sale of vacation condominium promising rental income).
179. See, e.g., Teague v. Bakker, No. 96-2186, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7079, at *8 (4th
Cir. Apr. 8, 1998) (per curiam) (―The proper focus of the inquiry is on the transaction
itself and the manner in which it is offered.‖), reprinted in [1998] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 90, 182, at 90, 630. Subjective intent, however, can be evidence of the objective
intent. See id.; see also Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1453 (Plaintiff testifies that ―but for‖
promise of rental profits he would not have entered the agreement). Nevertheless, the
offering must clearly display investment as its primary purpose. See, e.g., SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (advertisements for rare
coins in airplane magazines routinely referred to the opportunity as an investment and
compared coin growth to stock market growth).
180. See Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1462 (pooling of rental income). While Hocking did
not expressly hold a profit pooling arrangement was necessary for a consumption
purchase to become an ―investment,‖ the case involved a pooling arrangement. See id.
Moreover, courts assessing cases on similar facts declined to find ―investment
contracts‖ absent rental pooling arrangements. See, e.g., Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp.,
24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994) (pooling of rents without pooling of rental profits
does not satisfy vertical commonality requirement). Pooling appears to speak more
directly to the commonality requirement, but it remains critical in the consumption
versus investment analysis because jurisdictions that have yet to definitively adopt
either horizontal or vertical commonality use one or the other to knock out consumption
purchases without fund pooling. See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88
(2d Cir. 1994) (lack of rental pooling fails horizontal commonality); Mechigian v. Art
Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (Second Circuit has not decided
on horizontal or vertical commonality).
181. DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1 (art historically purchased for
enjoyment and concept of investing in art initially greeted with controversy).
182. See, e.g., Teague, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7079, at *8, reprinted in [1998] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90, 182, at 90, 630.
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because the analysis requires a relatively untoward display of
investment promotion183 and the art community has
historically shunned the purchase of art purely for
investment.184 Even with a primary motivation of investment,
the secondary presence of consumption property may very
well require a pooling arrangement,185 which cannot exist in
the usual art sale conveying full title to a single purchaser.186
For similar reasons, the sale of art requires the application
of ―broad vertical commonality‖ in order to satisfy the
―common enterprise requirement.‖ Lower courts187 vary in
183. See, e.g., Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (rare coin
advertisements in airplane magazines routinely referred to the opportunity as an
investment and compared coin growth to stock market growth).
184. DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1. But see id. at J-28 (some
merchants tout ability to create secondary markets); Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries,
Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 145–46 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff alleges art gallery promoted
investment value of art, ability to create secondary market, and a re-purchase plan).
Nevertheless, Stenger would still not pass objective review because the facts indicate
that the plaintiff approached the art gallery looking for an investment and galleries
typically do not even make an ―offer.‖ See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
26 cmt b. (1981) (advertisements of goods not ordinarily intended or understood to be
offers even when stating terms of suggested bargains in detail); infra note 218 and
accompanying text. Even under a subjective analysis, the motivation for an ordinary
art buyer is likely to involve some combination of consumption and investment on
account of the aesthetic value of art. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1;
Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1453 (plaintiff testifies that ―but for‖ promise of rental profits he
would not have entered the agreement). But see Stenger, 741 F.2d at 145–46 (plaintiff
alleges he approached art gallery with purely investment intent). Nevertheless, the
success of allegations comparable to the facts in the Stenger pleadings is questionable
since the court assumed their truth pursuant to appellate review of a dismissal and a
jury may not find them credible. See id. Of course, a jury may find such allegations
more credible when dealing with certain works by Picasso, which can have exceptional
investment potential yet substantially lack aesthetic value. See, e.g., Pablo Picasso,
Man with a Lollipop (1938). But see Pablo Picasso, Standing Nude (1907).
185. See, e.g., Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (lack of
rental pooling fails horizontal commonality); Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F.
Supp. 1421, 1426 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (Second Circuit has not decided on horizontal or
vertical commonality); see also case analysis supra note 180.
186. See, e.g., Christie’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 934 (title passes to
buyer upon sale); Sotheby’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 939 (title passes to
buyer upon sale). Here we see our first key difference between the typical transaction
in artwork and the chinchilla case. See Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d
414, 417–18 (8th Cir. 1974). Most people do not consume chinchillas (at least not in the
traditional sense of the word) and certainly do not ―consume‖ them in multiple breeding
pairs pursuant to a re-purchase plan that pools investor funds. See id. at 415.
187. The Supreme Court has not specified the manner for meeting the ―common
enterprise‖ requirement. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5
and the Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17, 37 (2005) (arguing the
Court punted on the opportunity to specify the requirement in SEC v. Edwards, 540
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requiring either ―horizontal commonality,‖188 ―strict vertical
commonality,‖189 or ―broad vertical commonality.‖190 While
―horizontal commonality‖ requires a pooling of investor
funds191 and cannot exist with a single investor,192 ―strict
vertical commonality‖ requires a sharing of the risks and
rewards among promoters and investors.193 ―Broad vertical
commonality,‖ however, merely needs a connection between
promoter expertise and the gain or loss of the investment.194
Art sales are only likely to meet this lower standard. The
typical art transaction does not satisfy ―horizontal
commonality‖ or ―strict vertical commonality‖ because it
conveys full ownership to a single buyer195 and therefore
involves neither a pooling of investor funds196 nor a sharing of
the risks and returns among promoters and investors.197 An
ordinary art sale can meet ―broad vertical commonality,‖
however, because the merchant‘s authentication expertise is
connected to a work‘s growth potential.198 Yet courts have
U.S. 389 (2004)). This lack of specification gives lower courts a variety of tools for
fighting securities fraud. See Mechigian, 612 F. Supp. at 1426 (horizontal or vertical
commonality available in Second Circuit). The flexibility may indicate an intentional
oversight of the Court as the requirement has remained unspecified for over sixty-five
years. See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
188. See 2 LOSS, supra note 172, at 932 (discussing ―horizontal commonality‖).
189. See id. at 936 (discussing ―strict vertical commonality‖).
190. See id. at 934 (discussing ―broad vertical commonality‖).
191. Id. at 931–33. They may also include investment schemes. Id. at 932 n.134
(citing SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49–51 (1st Cir. 2001) (endorsing the SEC‘s
suggestion that Ponzi schemes satisfy horizontal commonality)).
192. Id. at 933 (citing Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276–77 (7th
Cir. 1972)); see also Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 146–47 (7th Cir.
1984) (discussing ―horizontal commonality‖).
193. See 2 LOSS, supra note 172, at 936–38 (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595
F.2d 459, 460–61 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp.
1421, 1427–28 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (discussing ―strict vertical commonality‖).
194. See 2 LOSS, supra note 172, at 934–35 (citing SEC v. Cont‘l Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516, 521–23 (5th Cir. 1974)) see also Mechigian, 612 F. Supp. at 1427–28
(dicta analyzing hypothetical result under ―broad vertical commonality‖).
195. See, e.g., Christie’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 934 (title to the
auctioned lot passes to buyer upon sale); Sotheby’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at
939 (title to the auctioned lot passes to buyer upon sale).
196. See 2 LOSS, supra note 172, at 931–33; see also Stenger, 741 F.2d at 147
(transaction in artwork fails ―horizontal commonality‖).
197. Id. at 936–38; see also Mechigian, 612 F. Supp. at 1427–28 (sale of art printing
plate fails ―strict vertical commonality‖). Here we see the second key difference from
the chinchilla case, which involved the pooling of funds via a pyramid scheme. See
Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 415 (8th Cir. 1974).
198. See Mechigian, 612 F. Supp. at 1427–28 (dicta indicating sale of art printing
plate may satisfy ―broad vertical commonality‖); e.g., Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at
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thus far declined to apply ―broad vertical commonality‖ to
mistaken authentication claims in art transactions.199
Assuming judicial application of ―broad vertical
commonality,‖ an art sale may still fail the ―efforts of others‖
prong depending on how the jurisdiction handles prepurchase activities. In SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., the D.C.
Circuit excluded viaticals from the term ―investment contract‖
since the ―efforts of others‖ occurred primarily before the
transactions.200 In SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp., on the other
hand, the Eleventh Circuit held that viaticals fall under the
term
―investment
contract‖
notwithstanding
their
201
substantially pre-purchase ―efforts of others.‖
The
argument therefore depends on the jurisdictional view
regarding substantially pre-purchase activities.
The choice of jurisdiction or judge could be fatal to the
argument that an art transaction satisfies the ―efforts of
others‖ requirement. A judge or jurisdiction that does not
consider substantially pre-purchase efforts would decline to
allow authentication to meet this requirement202 since art
valuation generally occurs prior to sale.203 Such a jurisdiction
would make post-purchase merchant activities, like creating
secondary markets, a threshold requirement.204 Absent such
post-purchase activities, the case would need to be in a
jurisdiction or before a judge that allows predominately prepurchase activities to constitute ―efforts of others.‖205
834 (authentication important for appraisal).
199. See Stenger, 741 F.2d at 147 (art transaction does not pass ―horizontal
commonality‖ and dicta indicates that it would not pass ―vertical commonality‖);
Mechigian, 612 F. Supp. at 1427–28 (printing plate fails ―strict vertical commonality‖).
200. 87 F.3d 536, 547–48 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
201. 408 F.3d 737, 744 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald,
J., dissenting)).
202. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547–48 (profit generation substantially from prepurchase activities does not satisfy the ―efforts of others‖ prong).
203. See, e.g., Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(authentication occurred prior to sale).
204. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-28 (some merchants tout
ability to create secondary markets). Moreover, their sales pitch may have to be
overwhelmingly focused on the promotion of secondary markets, which is unlikely to
occur with more respectable art merchants. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 744. Here we see the third critical
distinction from the chinchilla case since it was the post-purchase ―efforts‖ of the buyback provision that the seller‘s alleged would generate profits. See Miller v. Cent.
Chinchilla Grp., Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 415 (8th Cir. 1974). Apparently, chinchillas are
much more difficult to raise than the sellers originally proposed. Id.
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Even with secondary market creation or jurisdictional
consideration of pre-purchase activities, art is not likely to
satisfy this prong on account of an implied requirement that
the value of the efforts primarily depends on future
occurrences or on-going conduct.206 The Mutual Benefits court
considered pre-purchase activities, but their value depended
primarily on the timing of future events.207 Similarly, the
Second Circuit in Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Inc. held that promoter creation of a secondary market
constituted ―efforts of others,‖208 but its value derived from the
on-going negotiation of favorable interest rates and the future
re-purchase option without redemption fees.209 Further, its
value primarily derived from these activities because the
lower interest rates and the ability to circumvent federally
mandated early redemption fees served to entice investment
in the program over direct purchase of the products.210
Ordinary art sales are not capable of meeting these
implied requirements. Unlike the pre-purchase activities in
Mutual Benefits, the authentication efforts of art merchants
relate to authorship and provenance and therefore derive
their value from past occurrences.211 Like Gary Plastic, art
merchant creation of secondary markets relates to on-going or
future activities since it involves their ability to resell or
206. See Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 744; Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v.
Merrill Lynch, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 233, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1985).
207. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 744. The pre-purchase efforts of the promoters
in the Mutual Benefits case included the viatical valuation and selection based on the
probable aggregate cost of insurance premiums contingent on the future timing of the
policy benefit. Id.
208. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240–41.
209. Id. at 233, 240–41.
210. See id. The Gary Plastic products were CDs. Id. at 233. The promoter‘s
market presence and bulk purchasing allowed lower interest rates over an individual
transaction directly from a bank. Id. at 233, 240–41. The option of the investor to
mandate promoter buy-back prior to maturity circumvented early redemption fees set
by federal banking laws. Id. These factors enticed investment in the program over
direct purchase from banks. Id. In other words, the value of the investment depended
on the fungibility of the products. See id. Additionally, all of the cases involved the
pooling of investor funds. See id. at 235; Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 n.4. The
Mutual Benefits case clearly satisfied both horizontal and vertical commonality. Id.
211. See Levy, supra note 3, at 847–48 (discussing methods of authenticating
artwork and the effect of authenticity in the appraisal process); see also DUBOFF &
HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-168 (inauthentic copy of Picasso‘s Boy with a Pipe
sells for $2500 and original sells for $104 million); Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union
League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (reattribution drops market
value of painting from $500,000 to $50,000 in the 1980‘s).
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repurchase the work.212 However, the distinguishing feature
of an ordinary art transaction is that it still primarily derives
its value from past occurrences because merchant ability to
re-sell or desire to repurchase evaporates in the event of a
mistake in authentication.213
A court may even refuse to apply the Howey test from the
outset.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver, the United States
Supreme Court opted not to apply Howey to a bi-lateral
privately negotiated transaction.214 The Court pointed to the
fact that the transactions in question involved neither offers
nor sales to multiple people.215 The Court also noted the
transaction involved an instrument that was not fungible nor
designed to be publicly traded.216 Instead of applying Howey,
the Court relied on these factors to reason that the
transaction did ―not fall within the ordinary concept of a
security.‖217
The typical art transaction also involves a bi-lateral
privately negotiated agreement.
A transaction with a
218
dealer
or an auction house via reserve bidding does not
involve offers to multiple people nor even offers at all.219
212. See Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 145–46 (7th Cir. 1984)
(allegations of gallery promotion of secondary market-making and a re-purchase plan).
213. See, e.g., Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1990) (purchase of
painting from dealer that later turns out to be fake precludes resale at auction house).
The creation of secondary markets is also not comparable to the mandatory buy-back
option in Gary Plastic because a buyer may acquire profits on the secondary market
independent of the promoter efforts and a unique piece of artwork is not fungible. See
Stenger, 741 F.2d at 147. Additionally, a pooling arrangement cannot exist in the usual
art transaction conveying full title to a single purchaser. See, e.g., Christie’s Conditions
of Sale, supra note 40, at 934; Sotheby’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 939. For
all of these reasons, a court may simply decline to apply the Howey test in the first
place.
214. 455 U.S. 551, 559–60 (1982).
215. Id. at 560.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 559 (quoting Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 (1979)).
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt b. (1981)
(―Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or television are
not ordinarily intended or understood to be offers. The same is true of catalogues,
prices lists, circulars, even though the terms of suggested bargains may be stated in
some detail.‖)
219. See id. § 28 cmt. b (an auctioneer excepting bids with reserve is requesting
―that the bidders make offers to him, as indeed he frequently states in his remarks to
those before him‖). Most auction house sales are with reserve. See id. § 28(1)(a)
(auction is with reserve ―unless a contrary intention is manifested‖); see Christie’s
Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 934 (Christie‘s reserves bids); Sotheby’s
Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 938 (Sotheby‘s reserves bids). The buyer then is
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While bidding without reserve may constitute a public
offering,220 the end result of all of the transaction types is full
conveyance of a good to a single purchaser.221 An original
work of art is neither fungible nor designed to be publicly
traded.222
This analysis is of course limited to the ordinary art
transaction that primarily derives its value from
authentication. An arrangement that meets the elements of
Howey or that possesses all of the attributes of other
regulated instruments may constitute a ―security.‖223 Howey
itself involved an appreciable asset, but the value of the
―investment contract‖ derived from the on-going and future
management efforts of the promoters.224 Additionally, the
Supreme Court held in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth that
the Howey test is unnecessary for instruments that possess all
of the attributes of a ―stock.‖225
The analysis does not cover arrangements falling outside
the scope of the ordinary art transaction, which may either
negotiating price based on the Conditions of Sale and the relative value of the artwork.
See Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. Ch. 2006) (buyer at auction
negotiates price through competitive bidding).
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 28(1)(b) (An auctioneer accepting
bids without reserve ―makes an offer to sell at any price bid by the highest bidder . . .‖);
see also U.C.C. § 2-328 (2004) (auction sale complete upon fall of the hammer). The
Dutch Auction method for securities sales is similar to bidding without reserve since in
each method the highest bidder(s) win(s). See § 28(1)(b); 1 LOSS, supra note 103, at
569–71.
221. See, e.g., Christie’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 934 (title passes to
buyer upon sale). The Dutch Auction method for selling securities is therefore
distinguishable because it typically involves the sale of multiple fungible instruments
to several institutional purchasers. 1 LOSS, supra note 103, at 569–71. Under the
Dutch method, sales are made to the top bidders covering the desired quantity of all of
the securities in the offering at the lowest price offered among these bidders. See id.
The method was recently used in the IPO for Google. Id. at 570.
222. See, e.g., DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J-1 (discussing aesthetic
value of art); id. at K-168 (inauthentic copy of Picasso‘s Boy with a Pipe sells for $2500
and original sells for $104 million). These factors constitute the final distinctions
between artwork and the chinchilla case since the latter involved offerings and sales to
multiple investors, as well as fungible goods. See Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla Grp., Inc.,
494 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1974). The Chinchilla arrangements were fungible because
they ―had equivalent values to most persons.‖ See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560.
223. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1946) (contrasting
purchase of fee simples with investment in management of citrus acreage); Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1985) (Howey is unnecessary when the
instrument in question possesses the normal attributes of a stock).
224. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300.
225. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 697–98.
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satisfy Howey or possess the attributes of a regulated
instrument.226 Assuming an arrangement meets the other
elements, it is likely to be an ―investment contract‖ if postpurchase ―efforts‖ create a primary market for a particular
piece or collection that otherwise lacks value.227 Similarly, a
―security‖ is likely to exist via the creation of fungible
instruments designed to be publicly traded that derive their
value from an art index or via the distribution of shares in a
company that invests in artwork.228 These more sophisticated
arrangements may be subject to federal regulation.229
B. Judicial Application of Securities Laws Provides
Marginal Protection
Even if art constitutes a ―security,‖ judicial application of
the securities laws will provide limited protection to buyers.
The statute of repose associated with section 10(b) would cap
the limitations period at five years.230 Section 10(b) therefore
provides the same temporal protection as states adopting the
2004 version of the UCC231 and less in states with a
limitations period greater than five years.232
Certain
226. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300; Landreth, 471 U.S. at 697–98.
227. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300; A Special Report on the Art Market, The Pop
Master’s Highs and Lows, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2009 (discussing $100 million dollar
sale of Eight Elvises and describing Warhol as the ―bellwether‖ of the art market).
Such works, however, do not otherwise derive their value from the talent of the artist or
arguably do not even constitute art. See id. (noting Eight Elvises is the only work by a
pop artist to sell for over $100 million and that a Swiss-based dealer was ―the driving
force behind distribution of Warhol‘s work‖ (emphasis added)); Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (successful copyright infringement action against another pop
artist). If it is not art, then it may be a ―security.‖
228. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 697–98; DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at J1 to -9 (discussing Mei/Moses Fine Art Index). If it is a security, then it is a ―security.‖
229. For these reasons, many securities law professors liken the definition of a
―security‖ to Justice Stewart‘s test for obscenity. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (―I know it when I see it . . . .‖). An ordinary art
sale is not a ―security‖ because it is just not obscene enough for federal regulation.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (2006) (section 10(b) ―discovery rule‖ subject to a fiveyear statute of repose).
231. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2004) (adopting ―discovery rule‖ subject to a five-year
statute of repose). It would also provide the same temporal protection in states
adopting a five-year limitations period. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725(1)
(West 2010) (five-year limitations period accrues regardless of knowledge of party).
232. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(1) (2010) (six years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.725
(West 2010) (six years). The theory would provide limited additional protection in
terms of the time for filing in states where the limitations period is shorter than five
years. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-2-725(1), 13-80-101(1) (West 2010) (statute of
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components of the expansion of liability under section 10(b)
are also questionable.233 The ―recklessness‖ scienter for 10(b)
liability is still one of the highest intent standards234 and a
private right of action under section 10(b) requires additional
elements to establish a prima facie case.235
C. Judicial Application of Securities Laws Generates
Illiquidity
In addition to providing limited additional protection,
judicial application of the securities laws to transactions in
artwork would decrease liquidity and buyer access. A finding
that art is a ―security‖ would impose the registration and
reporting requirements of the securities laws on a number of
transactions in artwork.236 To the extent art merchants
constitute issuers or underwriters,237 they may be inclined to
limitations for UCC is three years). These states do include New York. See N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-725(1)–(2) (McKinney 2011) (four years). Yet the five-year cap may still fail to
increase temporal protection in these states since auction houses often provide
warranties of five years or more. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 783
(Del. Ch. 2006) (six-year warranty in Christie‘s auction house sale increases protection
of UCC four-year limitations period).
233. Section 10(b) liability for material omissions requires a duty to disclose based
on a fiduciary relationship. See United States v. Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 741 (1997).
Given the reason for the issuance of securities and the critical distinctions in a
securities derivation of value, see infra note 253, a court is not likely to find that an art
seller has a fiduciary duty or agency relationship with a buyer and therefore would not
impose a disclosure duty. See Chiarrella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(fiduciary relationship necessary to invoke duty to disclose).
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1977) (defining ―recklessness‖);
see also Kenneth W. Simmons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 471–72
(1992) (―recklessness‖ is second most serious mental state in torts); cf. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(a)–(d) (1985) (listing the mens rea categories in criminal law). While
section 10(b) liability could reduce the intent requirement for fraud, see supra notes
120–122 and accompanying text, the extent of this reduction would vary by circuit and
the Seventh Circuit‘s more stringent standard of gross recklessness is the majority
view. See LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 121, at 1025–26.
235. 8 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3719–32 (3d ed. 2004)
[hereinafter ―8 LOSS‖]. The additional pleading requirements include proof of standing,
reliance, and loss causation. Id. Additionally, section 10(b)‘s calculation of damages at
the time of the action, see supra note 122, would not provide additional protection to
buyers because it benefits a seller‘s securities action against a buyer for a material
nondisclosure when the stock price undergoes a post-sale increase in value. See LOSS,
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 121, at 1285–87.
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)–(c) (2006) (outlawing the sale of any ―security‖ without
an effective registration statement).
237. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Section 4(1) exempts from section 5
―transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer.‖ 15 U.S.C. §
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sell artworks via ―exempted transactions.‖238 Buyers would
then have to hire securities lawyers upon resale in order to
ensure full compliance with the regulations by determining
the necessity of filing a registration statement versus seeking
an alternate exemption.239 These requirements may also
reduce the access of unsophisticated buyers by creating seller
preference for sophisticated or institutional purchasers in
order to meet the requirements of a number of ―exempted
transactions.‖240
Moreover, art authentication methods vary too greatly to
adhere to the standardized disclosure requirements of
securities laws in particular or standardized requirements
generally.241 The process of due diligence and disclosure for
securities
primarily
involves
quantifiable
financial
information.242 The methods for examining and disclosing
this information are amenable to regulations that require
consistent measures.243 Art authentication methods, on the
other hand, range from scientific244 to stylistic forms and
77d(1) (2006). Since artwork derives its value primarily from authentication, it is to a
large extent an analogue to both the issuer and the security, see infra notes 253–255
and accompanying text, making its owner a control person under section 2(a)(11). See
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006). As a result, the owner is an issuer and is not exempt
under section 4(1). See id. This exempted transaction alone highlights the difficulty of
applying the securities laws to the typical art sale. See id.
238. § 77d(1). There are also ―exempted securities,‖ which do not include artwork.
See id. § 77c(a).
239. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (b) (2010) (limited offering exemption requires
compliance with Rule 502); id. § 230.502(d) (resale of securities typically requires either
registration or new exemption). Similarly, the section 4(2) exemption for ―private
placement‖ transactions is a fact specific inquiry that does not just depend on the size of
the offering. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953).
240. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1) (2010) (Rule 144A exemptions require that
securities are offered and sold to a ―qualified institutional buyer‖).
241. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)–(c) (2006).
242. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2010) (Regulation S–X form and content for financial
statement disclosure requirements in a registration statement). Securities may involve
due diligence and disclosure of both quantitative and qualitative information, but even
this qualitative information typically relates to quantitative financial factors. E.g., id. §
229.305 (Regulation S–K quantitative and qualitative disclosures of market risk).
243. See id. The fungibility of securities provides for economies of scale not just in a
single distribution of securities, but also through multiple distributions of securities in
certain instances. See LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 121, at 86 (Rule 415 ―shelf
registration‖ generates lower issuer costs and underwriting spreads).
244. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-26 to -48 (describing a host of
scientific methods for authenticating art including radiocarbon dating,
thermoluminescent analysis, obsidian hydration, analytical reconstruction of
manufacturing technologies, microscopic techniques, x-ray diffraction, craquelure, and
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expert selection of these methods often depends on the
particular piece or its artist.245 Attribution itself necessarily
requires stylistic methods.246 The flexibility necessary for art
authentication and its inherently qualitative attribution
process are therefore not amenable to the imposition of
standardized requirements.247
Art authentication also analyzes information that is
temporally distinct from the information associated with
securities.248 The due diligence and disclosure process for
securities analyzes and relays information regarding
contemporaneous circumstances surrounding an issuer that is
well-documented or verifiable.249 Art authentication analyzes
information regarding past occurrences surrounding the
piece, including, inter alia, attribution and provenance.250
dendrochronology). The scientific measures serve to eliminate inauthentic works of art.
Id. at K-50.
245. See id. at K-49 to -50. Stylistic methods are qualitative in nature as they are
all based on some combination of the expert‘s knowledge, experience, intuition, eye for
detail, visual memory, and familiarity with the artist‘s entire collection. See id. at K-49
to -50; see also Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 776 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(detection of misattribution based on stylistic analysis of paintings subject and artist‘s
signature). The comparison method is considered best practices and relies on these
qualitative factors since it involves comparing the most minute details of a piece with
those found in an artist‘s authenticated works. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra
note 1, at K-50.
246. See id. at K-49 to -50. Technically stylistic analysis is the sole means of
attributing a piece since scientific methods serve only to verify or discredit an
attribution. Id. Stylistic methods also compensate for ―gray areas‖ that are otherwise
indistinguishable by scientific means, including, inter alia, works produced by multiple
artists or by artists and their apprentices. Jauregui, supra note 4, at 1960–62.
247. Unlike securities, see supra note 243, art authentication also does not often
benefit from economies of scale since it typically requires analysis of each piece, see
supra note 245 and accompanying text, and an auction house can sell hundreds of
pieces at a single auction. See, e.g., Christie’s, Fine American Paintings, Drawings and
Sculpture, NEW YORK SALE 2342, Sept. 28, 2010 (proposed sale of 278 lots).
248. See supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text.
249. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-11(a)–(c) (2010) (required filing of current reports on
Form 8–K); see also id. § 240.15d-13(a)–(e) (required filing of quarterly reports on Form
10–Q); id. § 229.301(a) (required reporting of financial data for each of last five fiscal
years). Even the due diligence and disclosure of information other than that describing
an issuer‘s present financial circumstances often consists of forward looking statements
and financial projections. Id. § 229.10(b) (SEC policy on forward looking statements).
Due diligence and data disclosure in securities primarily involves ―known knowns‖ and
secondarily involves ―known unknowns.‖ See SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS & MONEY:
KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 12 (2006)
(describing the division of data gathering into four categories of ―known knowns,‖
―known unknowns,‖ ―unknown knowns,‖ and ―unknown unknowns‖).
250. See Levy, supra note 3, § 10.02[A], at 834 (describing authentication,
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Authentication outcomes are inherently speculative for
antiquities in particular.251 The retrospective nature of the
authentication process makes it impossible for experts to
meet the demands of standardized requirements and precise
outcomes akin to those found in securities laws.252
The distinction between art authentication and securities
underwriting highlights a critical difference between
investing in securities and investing in artwork. Securities
primarily derive their value from the on-going business
activities of the issuer, as well as investor speculation
regarding the future of these activities.253 With respect to
authentication, art derives its value primarily from the past
occurrences of attribution and provenance.254 On account of
these different perspectives, the methods associated with the
respective valuations are simply too disparate for art sales to
conform to requirements like those found in securities laws.255
attribution, provenance, and appraisal).
251. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-25 (establishing authenticity
of aged pieces with 100% certainty ―is difficult even under the most favorable
circumstances‖); see also Greenberg Gallery, Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 173
(D.D.C. 1993) (art provenance can range from nearly flawless to highly speculative).
Indeed, leading experts and authorities in the world of art law note that it is best to
think of authentication in terms of probabilities. E.g., DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra
note 1, at K-25. Art authentication primarily involves ―known unknowns‖ and can
often involve ―unknown unknowns.‖ See id; DAS, supra note 249, at 12; see also Dawson
v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (―[Authenticating] antiquity is
by its very nature an inexact science.‖).
252. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-25; Levy, supra note 3, §
10.02[A], at 834; Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 467.
253. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 403 (1st ed.
2006) (discussing price behavior under the efficient market hypothesis). Similarly, in
the primary market, an issuer typically offers securities to raise capital for these
activities, see id. at 525, and in the case of stock the securities holder receives partownership in the company, creating an agency relationship. See id. at 14.
254. See DARRABY supra note 1, § 4:19, at 239 (―If on occasion authorship drops out
of the bargain, a huge and palpable price differential would be apparent.‖); id. § 2:58, at
88 (―Certain prior owners or events may effectively enhance value by providing the
artworks with a cachet.‖). While it is true that art auction houses tout the ability of art
to appreciate in value, other appreciable assets, including real estate, do not fall within
the framework of securities laws when they lack a derivation in value from present and
future activities of the issuer. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300
(1946) (purchase of fee simples versus investments in management of citrus acreage).
255. In addition to highlighting critical distinctions in authentication and
underwriting, these differences also highlight a shortcoming in the analogy of art sales
and securities distributions. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. The
shortcoming is that the issuer must be comparable to both the art seller and the
authentication itself. Even the example of securities sold on the secondary market,
where the art seller would be analogous to a trader in securities, continues to require
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In sum, authentication relies more heavily on an ―artistic‖
touch than the underwriting of securities. Of course, one can
be an ―artist‖ at anything.256 To the extent one may be an
artist at both attributing a painting and valuing a security,
the former is more comparable to French Impressionism
whereas the latter is more comparable to Realism.257 It would
be a mistake to require Monet to draw precise lines and to use
basic colors.258
VII. LEGISLATIVE ADOPTION OF FLEXIBLE DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS SUPPLEMENTS BUYER PROTECTION
AND WILL PROMOTE MORE EFFICIENT PRICING
The better approach is to design a statute tailored to the
unique nature of artwork and its market. The legislative
adoption of flexible disclosure requirements can increase
protection by expanding the filing period and reducing the
intent requirement.259 These changes will minimally disrupt
market fundamentals.260 Further, they will generate a free
flow of information that will theoretically enhance the pricing
of fine art.261
A. Flexible Disclosure Requirements Increase Protection
The legislative adoption of flexible disclosure requirements
would successfully provide buyers with additional
protection.262 The statute would require art merchants to
that the art authentication is analogous to the issuer.
256. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2006) (definition of ―artist‖ includes ―a person whose work exhibits exceptional skill‖);
see also MAN ON FIRE (Twentieth Century Fox 2004) (―A man can be an artist at
anything . . . it depends on how good he is at it‖).
257. See JULES ADELINE & FREDERICK WILLIAM FAIRHOLT, ADELINE‘S ART
DICTIONARY 209, 331 (1891) (defining ―Impressionism‖ and ―Realism‖); see also Richard
Brettell, Lecture One: The Realist and the Idealist (April 2002), in FROM MONET TO
VAN GOGH: A HISTORY OF IMPRESSIONISM (The Great Courses 2002) (describing
difference between Impressionism and Realism within the stylistic climate of the era);
Stenger v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1984) (―In a case that
we might term one of first Impressionism . . . .‖).
258. See Impressions, in The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, December 18, 1926, at
23 (noting Monet was widely recognized as the father of Impressionism and discussing
his perfection of the style).
259. See infra Part VII.A.
260. See infra Part VII.B.
261. See infra Part VII.C.
262. Auction houses are already familiar with similar statutory requirements as
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provide pre-sale written disclosure of the facts associated with
the authentication process of each work to its potential
buyers.263
It would cover material misstatements and
omissions264 subject to a ―gross negligence‖ standard and the
―discovery rule‖ with a longer statute of repose. 265 In sum, art
merchants would be liable for gross negligence in material
misstatements and nondisclosures regarding the process and
probability of authentication for an extended time period.266
The statute would provide additional protection to buyers
that would complement the common law.267
Disclosure
many key jurisdictions require disclosure of their financial relationship with consignees
and reserve bidding techniques. Olsoff, supra note 1, § 11.03, app. at 934 (citing New
York City Auction Regulations § 2-122(d)). These disclosure requirements are limited
to financial arrangements associated with the piece, including guarantees, bidding by
consignors, loans and advances, and reserve bidding. Id. Yet most state laws exclude
auctioneers from disclosure requirements regarding authorship. DARRABY, supra note
1, § 5:8, at 295. Similarly, art merchants are not subject to disclosure requirements
regarding a piece‘s provenance. Id. § 2:59, at 90. Under current law, the duty to
request information regarding authentication assessment is typically placed upon the
prospective buyer. See, e.g., id. § 2:58, at 88 (―Prospective Buyers should request
written disclosure of facts, methods, and procedures, and materials and sources relied
upon or referred to by the seller, or used as a basis of the offer and sale.‖).
263. The duty to disclose would not be conditioned upon a fiduciary or agency
relationship and only the actual buyer of a piece would be able to hold sellers liable for
non-disclosures. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (1977) (negligent
misrepresentation claim independent of agency relationship limited to specific person(s)
and transaction(s)). But see Chiarrella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(fiduciary relationship or other relationship of trust necessary to invoke disclosure duty
in securities law). The writing containing representations and disclosures should also
provide buyers with notice of their rights under the statute, the nature of their
relationship with the art merchant, and a recommendation to seek the post-transaction
advice of an independent appraiser. One paragraph should suffice.
264. The materiality of the fact would be subject to analysis based at the time of the
omission and not the time of its discovery or the time of trial. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
265. Cf. 31 U.S.C.A § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2010) (False Claims Act liability for material
false statement); § 3729(a)(1)(G), (b)(3) (False Claims Act liability for knowing nondisclosure and retention of obligation); id. § 3731(b)(2) (False Claims Act ―discovery
rule‖ subject to a ten-year statute of repose); United States v. Massenburg, No. 2:030437, 2004 WL 2370694, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 21, 2004) (applying United States v.
Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941–42 (D.C. Cir. 1997), to interpret ―knowingly‖ under the False
Claims Act as equivalent to ―gross-negligence-plus‖). Legal analysis in this Article
assumes a ten-year statute of repose though the exact length of the cap ought to be
based on actuarial analysis minimizing the negative impact on pricing. See infra note
276.
266. Under a ten-year statute of repose, the filing period would exceed the typical
warranty. See Christie’s Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 935–37 (five years);
Sotheby’s, Conditions of Sale, supra note 40, at 941–42 (five years).
267. See Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Haw., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1558–59 (D. Haw.
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requirements subject to ―gross negligence‖ would assist in all
actions by finding liability for omissions under a low intent
standard.268 Assuming a ten-year statute of repose, the
―discovery rule‖ would prevent the time bar of a number of
actions.269 Cases falling outside protection would either be
just outcomes based on common law findings of fact270 or
casualties of a policy that balances both legal principles and
market fundamentals.271
1990); Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D.
Pa. 1987); Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461, 467–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But
see Wilson v. Hammer, 850 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1988); Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903
A.2d 773, 778 (Del. Ch. 2006).
268. E.g., Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 468. Since Dawson was filed within the breach of
warranty limitations period, the disclosure requirements would have provided an
alternative pleading. See id. The Dawson seller‘s nondisclosure of his means for
establishing provenance would have constituted gross negligence for the piece where he
relied solely on a photographic comparison to represent that the piece was displayed in
the Met. See id. Simply contacting the museum revealed that the piece still remained
in the possession of the Met. Id.
269. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1558–59 (filing approximately eight years after last
sale); Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 821 (filing a little over five years from time of sale).
The disclosure requirements and extended filing period would have benefitted the
Firestone case because the seller would have been liable if he knew or should have
known of the facts relied upon in the scholarly publication reattributing the piece just
four years after the sale and failed to disclose them. See id. A ten-year cap would not
protect all of the Balog transactions since the first sale occurred eleven years prior to
the filing of the action, but would protect the remaining sales spanning several years.
See Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1558–59. Additionally, Balog had a strong case for common
law fraud and the evidence of fraudulent concealment tolled the UCC statute of
limitations in the actual holding. Id. at 1572–73.
270. See, e.g., Greenberg Gallery, Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 169–71 (D.D.C.
1993) (no liability when plaintiff damage to piece in transit likely caused evidence
alleged in support of misattribution); see also Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 467–71 (no
liability for piece where all experts agreed upon authenticity). Assuming sufficient
evidence of fraudulent intent on remand, the Rosen case would fall under this category
since the Second Circuit indicated that the ―discovery rule‖ would toll the fraud claim.
Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 36 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990).
271. See Wilson, 850 F.2d at 5 (action brought twenty-six years after sale); Krahmer,
903 A.2d at 778 (action brought eighteen years after sale); see also Rosen, 894 F.2d at
30 (action filed eighteen years after sale). Yet even these cases could have benefitted
from the statutorily required notice, which may have induced the buyers to acquire
independent appraisers within the statute of repose. See, e.g., id. at 32 (―Requiring a
purchaser to obtain [an] appraisal from an expert other than the seller is not an
onerous burden.‖); Wilson, 850 F.2d at 7 (―[Plaintiffs] easily could have discovered the
problem from the outset by means of a second expert opinion.‖). In each of these cases,
the first independent appraiser retained by the buyers suspected a mistake in
authentication. Rosen, 894 F.2d at 36 at 30; Wilson, 850 F.2d at 4; Krahmer, 903 A.2d
at 776. This fact is particularly relevant in the Rosen and Krahmer cases where the
buyers sought the first appraisal of the sellers within seven and four years of the
transactions, respectively. See Rosen, 894 F.2d at 30; Krahmer, 903 A.2d at 775. The

TOBIN_FINE ART

378

7/29/2011 10:51 AM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 21.2

B. Flexible Disclosure Requirements Minimally Disrupt
Market Fundamentals
The added protection will be minimally disruptive of wellestablished legal principles. The statute minimizes any
conflict of interest associated with a disclosure duty because it
does not impose an agency or fiduciary relationship in the
absence of agent assent to principal control.272 It also
minimizes any limitation on the freedom of contract of the
parties because it does not negate all disclaimers.273 Instead,
the theory balances a duty to disclose and a lower intent
requirement with an extended filing period subject to an
intermediate statute of repose.274
This balance results in a less substantial disruption of the
market in the form of decreased access and liquidity.275 The
statute would also provide the benefit of allowing buyers to make this decision in light
of the post-sale appreciation of a given piece of art. See, e.g., Rosen, 894 F.2d at 30
(seller appraised piece at over ten times the initial purchase price within seven years of
the transaction); Krahmer, 903 A.2d at 775 (seller appraised piece at more than double
the purchase price within four years of sale). Stated with less naivety, buyers
suspecting that sellers are inflating post-sale appraisals will often still have time to
consult an independent expert and file an action if necessary. See Rosen, 894 F.2d at
30; Krahmer, 903 A.2d at 775. Nevertheless, the Wilson plaintiffs could have still
benefitted from the disclosure requirements since their negligence claim was dismissed
for want of a fiduciary relationship and the statutory requirement to suggest
consultation with an independent appraiser may have encouraged a timelier filing of
the action. See Wilson, 850 F.2d at 9 (distinguishing negligence claim from legal
malpractice claim invoking fiduciary duties); supra note 263.
272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b (2006) (agent duty to
disclose associated with agent assent to principal control). Admittedly, the statute
expands liability by covering omissions without requiring the specific intent or the
special relationship of trust necessary in a fraud action. Contra RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 528–529, 550–551 (1977). Yet the statute of repose bridles
this leniency. See supra notes 265, 269 and accompanying text.
273. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004). But see Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72
(authentication automatically constitutes an express warranty of future performance
under UCC § 2-725(2) even absent explicit wording of seller). The disclosure
requirements do restrict freedom of contract by not relying on the typical requirements
of privity for a professional negligence claim and a limitation of the duty to the client
for a negligent performance of contract action. See FEINMAN supra note 147, at 31, 62
n.12. (privity in negligence action and limitation of duty element to client in claim for
negligent performance of contract). Yet the heightened gross negligence standard
bridles this restriction on freedom of contract. See supra notes 265, 268 and
accompanying text.
274. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B), (G) (2006); § 3729(b)(3); id. § 3731(b)(2); United
States v. Massenburg, No. 2:03-0437, 2004 WL 2370694, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 21,
2004).
275. But cf. Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1569–72. In practice, the Balog decision as a
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balance generates a smaller allocation of costs onto buyers as
a consequence of mandatory legal requirements, which
corresponds to a smaller increase in prices, a smaller decrease
in buyer access, and a smaller increase in illiquidity.276 Art
merchants would be entitled to make business decisions about
representations and disclosures for each piece277 and buyers
would be free to negotiate the terms of the contract depending
on this information.278 The market would continue to allocate
a significant share of the risk.279
C. Flexible Disclosure Requirements Promote Efficient
Pricing
The statute would also enhance this market allocation of
risk by promoting more efficient prices. The threat of
litigation would encourage art merchants to engage in greater
disclosure and more accurate representations regarding the
process and probability of authentication for any given work
of art.280 Access to more complete and accurate information
whole may not generate extreme results for several reasons, including, inter alia, its
adoption of a ―reasonable basis in fact‖ inquiry. See id. at 1566. To test this hypothesis
in particular, a case with the facts of Firestone would have to be brought in such a
jurisdiction. See Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819,
820–21 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (post-sale reattribution via art scholar publication); Balog, 745
F. Supp. at 1566 (―reasonable basis in fact‖); Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 467 (―reasonable
basis in fact‖); supra note 145.
276. See WESSELS, supra note 155, at 114 (aggregate demand decreases when price
level rises). Actuarial analysis should thus determine the exact length of the statute of
repose in order to minimize a negative impact on pricing by considering the costs
associated with the probability and volume of additional litigation under the statute.
277. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (2004) (―[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is
to determine what it is the seller has in essence agreed to sell . . . .‖). These decisions
would balance the desire to sell with the probability of authentication and the risk of
liability. See DUBOFF & HOLT CAPLAN, supra note 1, at K-25 (establishing authenticity
of aged pieces with 100% certainty ―is difficult even under the most favorable
circumstances.‖).
278. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Christie‘s Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(discussing buyer control over bid price); cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 6 (―This is not intended
to mean that the parties, if they consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as
they wish.‖). Buyers are also free to make decisions regarding whether to hire an
independent appraiser for pre-purchase consultative purposes or for post-purchase
insurance purposes or both. See supra note 263. Buyers would be able to make the
post-purchase decisions in light of appreciation. See supra note 271.
279. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2004).
280. E.g., Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 468 (photo comparison relied on for provenance
in the Met without contacting the museum). It would also deter sellers from conducting
inaccurate post-sale appraisals or from post-sale appraisal of their former pieces in
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will allow buyers to decide the optimal price for the piece
based on their judgment of the probability of the
authentication and the risk associated with a mistake in
authentication, including one resulting from the post-sale
discovery of new information.281 The free flow of information
will generate more efficient prices for works of fine art.282
CONCLUSION
The development of a transactional environment that will
benefit purchasers of fine art for generations to come requires
the same sophistication and attention to detail that is
necessary to create a masterpiece. The legislative adoption of
flexible disclosure requirements can appropriately expand
buyer protection by supplementing the common law.283 These
changes will minimally disrupt well-established legal
principles and market fundamentals.284 They also have the
potential to enhance the pricing of artwork.285 ―Warrior‖ Pope
Julius II commissioned the painting of the Sistine Chapel
against Michelangelo‘s better judgment.286 Yet humankind
may not have enjoyed this masterpiece for the last five
centuries if the Pope had not granted Michelangelo the
freedom to select biblical scenes of his choosing.287
general. See supra note 271.
281. See, e.g., Krahmer, 903 A.2d at 781 (buyer pricing considers risk of mistake in
authenticity); Firestone v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 820–21 (post-sale
reattribution via art scholar publication). Based on these disclosures, buyers will pay
more for pieces whose authentication seems less speculative and less for pieces whose
authentication seems more speculative. See id.
282. The free flow of information benefits pricing in any transaction because ―unless
you have the facts, you cannot make proper judgments about what is going on.‖ HARRY
S. TRUMAN, MR. CITIZEN 31 (1953).
283. See supra Part VII.A.
284. See supra Part VII.B.
285. See supra Part VII.C.
286. See ANDREW GRAHAM-DIXON, MICHELANGELO AND THE SISTINE CHAPEL 1
(2009) (Michelangelo initially resisted the commission because his talent was primarily
in sculpting and he thought it was a set up for failure).
287. See JOHN T. PAOLETTI & GARY M. RADKE, ART IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 343–45
(1st ed. 1997) (Michelangelo persuaded the Pope to discard the original plan of the
twelve disciples in favor of the narrative panels that exist today); ROBIN RICHMOND,
MICHELANGELO AND THE CREATION OF THE SISTINE CHAPEL 63 (Crescent Books, 1999
ed.) (Letter from Michelangelo noted Pope stated ―quello che io volevo‖ or to do what he
wanted); BENJAMIN BLECH & ROY DOLINER, THE SISTINE SECRETS: MICHELANGELO‘S
FORBIDDEN MESSAGES IN THE HEART OF THE VATICAN 117 (1st ed. 2008)
(Michelangelo‘s letter indicated that the Pope permitted his changes.).

